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# Divisional Competition within The Coordination Framework

14-11-2022

## Authors

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**Summary :** In the past few months, confronting Al-Sadr and preventing Kadhimi to stay at the office were two factors that unified the Coordination Framework for a while. However, now Sadr temporarily is somehow not there and Khadhimi is not the PM anymore

The campaigns of directing accusations to Kadhmi's government and promoting Mohammed Shia's cabinet are about to face conflict within the Coordination Framework. In the past few months, confronting Al-Sadr and preventing Kadhimi to stay at the office were two factors that unified the Coordination Framework for a while. However, now Sadr temporarily is somehow not there and Khadhimi is not the PM anymore. It's time to share the booties and this is exactly where the conflict starts. Moreover, sensitive security positions in the intelligence department, national security, and the PMF are witnessing intense competition to be controlled.

According to convenient sources, during the ruling era of the Coordination Framework, some collusions and interest conflicts appeared. The conflict form represents as follows:

## **Maliki and Khazali vs. Falih Al-Fayyadh**

### **Maliki vs. Amiri**

### **Maliki and Amiri vs. Khazali**

Last but not the least, the attempts of Al-Maliki for controlling Sudani by suggesting to change the dollar exchange rate from 145K IQD to 137.5K per \$100 comprise another page of the story.

Amid this conflict, the majority of Shiite leaders are angry with Falih Al-Fayyadh for two reasons. The first is his adherence to the leadership of the PMF. Secondly, for normalizing Khamis al-Khanjar's case in Iraq and the imposition of an agreement with him on the Shiite leaders. Especially after al-Khanjar announced his "agreement with Coordination Framework leaders". Al-Khanjar claimed that the agreement implicates PMF evacuation from the Sunni areas. This announcement led to tension and protest in the Shiite streets, and the protesters often chanted the name of Qais Khazali. At the same time, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq publicly stood against Al-Khanjar's statement. This opposition made Fayyad announce the presidency of his political party, the "Ataa" movement.

Besides the PMF, there is massive conflict and tension about controlling Iraqi Intelligence which was previously managed by Kadhimi's office manager, Raed Johi. However, as all the decisions made by the caretaker government (Kadhimi's gov) were canceled, the Iraqi intelligence service does not have a director anymore. This gap made the Assaib and Nojaba Movement in hurry to take over this position, while the US and the International Coalition care about it too. Al-Kadhimi could become prime minister in 2020 as he had become Iraqi intelligence director. According to the obtainable information, to keep the US Embassy calm about this, Sudani has decided to temporarily flee this position by himself. Sudani will stay in charge of the position until he finds someone to fill it. Through this step, Sudani had stood against the division within the Shia as well as kept himself away from confronting the US and the International Coalition. The intelligence department was reestablished by the US in 2003, and it is connected to many other regions and neighboring countries.

The Coordination Framework actors consider the absence of Al-Sadr as an opportunity to control over the deep state. They also aim to obtain guarantees and insurance through these attempts. During Kadhimi's presidency, the Coordination Framework continuously shared accusations saying that through these sensitive security departments plans are made against them and these departments are ruining their reputation externally. Also, they were accusing the intelligence department of the killing of Mohandes and Sulaimani. The Coordination Framework attempts to hold these positions create problems for Sudani because it stands against the principles of managing the country logically as well as his commitment to western countries that goes against quotas in sharing power over security departments. However, Sudani

is dealing sensitively with this issue, and so far he has worked on calm down the escalations.

The Coordination Framework is still their honeymoon of formatting the government (the beginning of Sudani's government). The Coordination Framework already has excuses to cover its shortages (if they face any), and that could be through spotting the lights on the previous government's shortages, specifically last year's performance of the government, which was somehow in disrepair. They are assisted by a large media machine which is the Islamic channel close to Iran, but as time goes on, both people expect practical and different steps from the government, and the interests of these groups become more confrontational. Especially, since each of them considers itself the reason behind the Coordination Framework's success and Sadr's relegation. Also, the condition of the situation provides an opportunity for each of them to move forward and try to obtain gaining. Sudani himself has received guarantees that he will not face the same faith as former Iraqi PM Abulmahdi. Mohammed Shia has emphasized that this government will be in charge for one year only then to set a date for an early election. This could happen if Sudaini had decided to stay out of the game.