Hussein Omar: I warmly welcome you to the first panel of the 3rd Erbil Conference, organized by the Rudaw Research Center in collaboration with other research centers. We extend our thanks to them. Today, we will discuss the future of post-Assad Syria and the reconstruction of security and politics in the region. I will not repeat the names of my distinguished guests, as they have already been introduced by our friend Shahian. I will start with Dr. Jawad Anani, former Deputy Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister of Jordan. You are very welcome.

Of course, the changes in Syria and the new political landscape will have a significant impact on regional and even international security, especially from the perspective of Jordan and the Gulf countries. What is your envisioned outlook for Syria in the context of Jordan? How do you foresee the post-Assad transition?

Jawad Anani: Thank you very much for your question, and first of all, I would like to thank the organizers of this conference. This is the first time I have been honored to visit Iraqi Kurdistan, and I am very happy about that. Secondly, I’ve noticed many bright and intellectual faces here, and I am truly pleased with this forum.

To answer your direct question, I must say that Jordan’s uncertainty regarding the previous situation in Syria was much greater than its current position. While both the past and present situations require us to act with caution, it is especially important in politics to approach a situation you do not fully understand—one where you don’t know how it occurred or who is responsible—with great care. In such cases, you must look at the situation cautiously, with an attitude of expectation or even perceived threat.

So, what did Syria represent for us before the recent developments? First, it was a threat to our northern border with Syria due to rampant drug trafficking at the time. Another issue was the movement of people from northern Syria to the Jordanian border, as well as from the northern Jordanian and southern Syrian fronts. These movements not only facilitated drug smuggling but also involved individuals who played a terrorist role, posing a direct threat to Jordan’s security. This tension in Jordan kept us constantly on alert. We found that gangs and international criminal organizations were also operating in the region, using the Syrian route to smuggle drugs into Jordan.

Previously, most of the transfers were such that Jordan was a means of transit rather than a destination for drugs. However, recently, the new type of drugs on the market are cheap, low-cost, and accessible to ordinary people, which has led to their entry into the market.

Now, we estimate that about 10% of what is smuggled through Jordan stays in Jordan. This places a huge burden and grief on families.

When there was a change in Syria, we raised our concerns with the former Syrian regime. I remember one official on a television screen telling me, "We can't do anything; help us, we need help."

The truth is, Jordan has taken bolder steps, but we deeply respect the sovereignty of our neighbors. We do not wish to overstep, but there are still attempts at smuggling, and these are now utilizing new tools.

If one studies the so-called economics of criminal organizations, it becomes clear that they have specific structures and approaches. Most importantly, they are now using new technological tools, such as drones. They not only employ new types of weapons, but also new surveillance systems, along with advanced attempts to evade electronic monitoring. We have faced all these challenges and are familiar with them firsthand.

Furthermore, Jordan would be pleased to see Syria restore its dignity. If Syria can rebuild itself, establishing a system that respects all its neighbors, it could become a nation that leads the entire region toward broader horizons. Therefore, we remain cautious, as we say in English, "expecting the worst while hoping for the best." This is the current situation.

Hussein Omar: We will conclude this conversation with you, but allow me to turn to Mr. Cengiz Çandar, a member of the Turkish parliament from the DEM Party-Diyarbakır. Welcome, Mr. Çandar. When I learned that you would be a guest at this meeting, I revisited the section on the Syrian events in your book Mesopotamian Train. In it, you describe how Turkey's initial wish at the beginning of the Syrian conflict was to make minor changes to the Syrian government by introducing three ministers from the Muslim Brotherhood. Now, some argue that, after years of the Syrian conflict, the entire Syrian situation has essentially fallen into Turkey's hands, and that Turkey now holds the keys to Syria's solution and future development. Is this description accurate? Can Turkey handle the Syrian issue alone? And how has Turkey formulated its new policy in the Middle East, particularly regarding a post-Assad Syria?

Cengiz Çandar:
Before answering the question, I want to emphasize that we are on the verge of very dramatic developments in the Middle East, brought about by the brutal war in Gaza, which has devastated the entire region where Palestine is situated. We have an American president discussing the possibility of pushing the indigenous people of Gaza out in order to colonize it and transform it into a Middle Eastern "Riviera." It seems that Israel is not particularly disturbed by this possibility.

The second major change in the region is the collapse of the Syrian regime. This collapse is significant because the regime had survived for more than 60 years—over half a century—creating an entirely new situation. Before these developments in Gaza and the regime change in Syria, Turkish decision-makers would boast that Turkey was an important regional power. They projected an image of self-confidence, both domestically and internationally, often stating that no bird could fly over the skies of the Middle East without Turkey’s knowledge or consent. This belief stemmed from Turkey’s historical legacy as the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire.

When regime change occurred in Syria, an Arab-Sunni faction began marching from Idlib, a province in Syria that had been under Turkey’s military control for seven years. Turkey saw this faction—its proxy and protégé—marching toward Damascus with the aim of toppling the Syrian government and replacing it. This led to the question: Has Syria now become for Turkey what it was in the days of Sultan Selim I in the 16th century, when it was part of the Ottoman Empire?

Now, Syria appears to be under Turkey’s influence, as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which was sponsored, protected, and initiated by Turkey, has risen to power in Damascus. Can we conclude that Turkey’s claims of being a dominant regional power are now proven correct? Turkish leaders argue that their stance on Syria has been vindicated, asserting that supporting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was the right decision.

We can conclude that Syria is under Turkey's influence and that Turkey controls Syria. However, if asked whether this is entirely true, I would contest it. I would argue that we should not be so certain about what has happened. One crucial aspect of the situation in the Middle East, particularly regarding its future, is the chaos and uncertainty. The region has historically experienced turbulence and turmoil, but never in recent history has the situation been as uncertain and chaotic as it is today.

If one believes that Turkey has full control over Syria and that Syria belongs to Turkey, it would imply that the region is stabilized. The presence of regional powers, such as Turkey, controlling Syria would suggest that everything is under control. However, in reality, everything is far from being under control. The primary reason for this is the presence of a new element in Syria that Turkey has yet to reconcile with—the Kurdish-controlled areas.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are predominantly Kurdish, control nearly one-third of Syrian territory. They represent one of the most well-trained military forces in Syria today. Unlike other factions, they do not seek to surrender to Damascus or bow before figures such as Ahmed al-Sharaa. They are not willing to lay down their arms, discard their uniforms, and hand over control of Hasakah, Qamishli, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and other territories to the Syrian regime. Instead, they advocate for Kurdish rights to be recognized within a restructured Syria—one that is governed by a new national accord rather than being a mere continuation of the Assad family's rule.

Turkey, on the other hand, strongly supports Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and seeks to legitimize it while simultaneously striving to control all Syrian territory, including areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces. However, this stance is contradictory—Turkey's support for HTS and its desire to dominate the entire region does not align with the reality on the ground.

Hussein Omar: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the situation in northeastern Syria have always been a red line for Turkey, and they continue to be. The latest development is the initiative in question—the initiative of Mr. Abdullah Öcalan—and the potential progress in peace talks in Turkey. How will this affect Turkey's stance on the Syrian Democratic Forces and the solution to the Kurdish issue? Could this initiative have a positive or negative impact on Kurdish relations with the central government? Could this initiative lead to a softer Turkish approach towards the SDF in order to prevent further separation between the SDF and Damascus?

Cengiz Çandar: This is a significant question, and all of us in Turkey are awaiting an answer. We don’t have a definitive answer yet, but it’s highly likely that within the next few days—either tomorrow, the day after, or within three days—Öcalan will make a call, urging his organization, the PKK, to end its armed struggle, lay down its arms, and disband the organization. As President Nechirvan Barzani said today, this process will take time. We cannot expect the entire region to become peaceful within a week because these matters require time.

If this initiative succeeds, it will also have an impact on Syria, as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are primarily influenced by Öcalan and his followers. If a peaceful initiative unfolds in Turkey, this could lead to a situation where, in Syria, the SDF and Turkey, with Öcalan’s mediation, might reach a compromise. In that case, we might see Turkey soften its strong opposition to the SDF, as it has maintained in the past.

Furthermore, we are witnessing the possibility of a new Syria, similar to the developments in Iraq. To illustrate, I will reference Turkey’s position on Kurdish self-rule in Syria. I am not referring to autonomy, federation, or any specific political structure—just Kurdish self-rule in northeastern Syria. Turkey’s official opposition to this has been consistent and is not new. It has been expressed multiple times since the onset of the Syrian civil war by Turkish leaders, including President Erdoğan.

In August 2014, before he became president, and on multiple occasions afterward, Erdoğan made Turkey’s position clear. Speaking to Turkish journalists, he stated—though he did not use the word “Kurdistan”—that Turkey could not allow what happened in northern Iraq to be repeated in northern Syria. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was established in northern Iraq, and although Turkey found it difficult to prevent, it was strategically important for the future to ensure that northern Syria did not follow the same path. He explicitly stated that Turkey would do everything possible to prevent the emergence of Kurdish self-rule in northern Syria, regardless of the cost.

Now, we are at a stage where Kurdish self-rule in Syria has taken shape. Whether Turkey can prevent it or not, it is unlikely that military force alone will be effective. Why? Because of the American presence in the region. If the U.S., under Trump or any future administration, strikes a deal with Turkey and withdraws its forces, the situation could change in unpredictable ways.

However, since the focus of this discussion is on Öcalan’s potential call for disarmament and the peace process, we may not need to wait for U.S. policy shifts. If this peace initiative in Turkey succeeds, it will influence the situation in Syria. Turkey may adopt a more inclusive approach, not just supporting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or other Sunni-Salafi groups, but engaging with all components of Syrian society, especially the Kurdish people. That would be the best possible outcome.

Still, we must wait for Öcalan’s call and observe how things develop. In this region, particularly regarding the Kurdish issue, outcomes are never certain. Things can either move toward peace or take an unexpected turn. We remain hopeful and pray for a positive resolution. In the near future, we must be flexible and careful in guiding events toward a peaceful conclusion. If the Kurdish issue is resolved in Syria, it will have a significant impact on Turkey as well.

Hussein Omar: Thank you very much, Member of Parliament. We would be happy to have you stay with us, but we understand that you need to leave due to your commitments. We thank you for your time and the information you provided. Now, let us move to the remarks of Dr. Saeed Khatibzadeh, Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran and President of the Institute for Political Studies at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Khatibzadeh, Iran has arguably suffered the most from the changes in Syria due to the long-standing strategic relationship it has had, for perhaps over three decades, with the Assad regime. Now that the situation in Syria has shifted dramatically, how does Iran plan to navigate the challenges of its new relationship with Syria, especially following the potential fall of Assad and the emergence of a new regime in Damascus?

Saeed Khatibzadeh:
The dynamics in Syria can be viewed from several different angles. Of course, there are challenges we are currently observing in Syria, including those mentioned by our Turkish colleagues. The situation is somewhat strange to me because I doubt that any Arab country could be overtaken by another. This is my perspective, and I believe the people of Syria deserve a national, inclusive government. What is important for Iran is the principle of independence, the unity of the country, and the establishment of an inclusive government.

If we examine Syria from various perspectives, there are multiple issues to discuss. One of these issues is the presence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which currently holds power in certain areas. As our Turkish colleague pointed out, there seems to be some concern in Ankara about this. However, the fundamental question is: Who exactly is HTS? Are they recognized by all countries, or are they simply former extremist jihadists, foreign fighters, and some Uyghurs who have joined HTS? We are aware of the presence of Uyghurs among their ranks.

Furthermore, while we have heard positive statements from Ahmad al-Sharaa, what we expect is concrete action in line with those words. Our Jordanian colleague also highlighted the security situation in the southern part of the country, which remains extremely fragile. Tehran advocates for a unified Syria—one with an inclusive government where all ethnic groups and citizens have a voice, and the rights of minorities are respected. We are cautiously optimistic that we may witness a more stable and inclusive government in the future.

The key issue we must address today is the exact challenges ahead for Syria. One of the most concerning aspects of Syria’s future is Israel’s strategy. What we are witnessing from Israel’s actions in Syria is deeply troubling. Israel is actively fragmenting Syrian society by engaging with Druze and other minorities to create further divisions. This, combined with foreign occupation, is a significant concern for us. Syria already has multiple occupiers, and now there is a new one—Israel—just 20 kilometers from Damascus. Can you imagine that? They are not planning to leave anytime soon, having deployed 4,000 soldiers, along with arms, weapons, and other equipment.

Despite these developments, we have not heard anything from Ahmad al-Sharaa regarding this occupation. The issue is not only about the future of the occupation—it is about the future of Syria itself. Can you imagine any country allowing foreign forces to establish military installations just 20 kilometers away from its capital? The Syrian people's future is under threat, and therefore, everyone must support the establishment of an inclusive government that can bring an end to foreign occupation.

What we see in Syria today necessitates sending stronger moral messages, emphasizing that the continued occupation of Syria prevents its stabilization—something that greatly concerns us. Moreover, we must also consider what is happening in Palestine, as its situation is directly connected to Syria. In this panel, as well as in the previous one, the topic of Palestinian displacement was mentioned. There is an ongoing policy of annexing the West Bank to Israel. I must be diplomatic in stating that all countries, including Arab nations, Iran, and Turkey, should be fully aware of the hegemonic tendencies in Israel at this moment.

Netanyahu is not seeking peace by resolving the Palestinian issue. Instead, his aim is to make it impossible for Palestinians to return to their lands. If we do not cooperate, the future of the region looks bleak. Iran’s position is to cautiously support, follow, and engage in dialogue with Iraq, Turkey, and all independent voices in the region in order to establish an inclusive arrangement for the future. Furthermore, we must not overlook the efforts being made in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to create some form of regional stability. Tehran is more than willing to support these initiatives for the sake of a stable and secure future for the region.

Hussein Omer: I now turn to Dr. Gang Zheng, Director of the Center for Foreign Security Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing. China’s foreign policy traditionally emphasized avoiding direct interference in the complex and conflict-ridden Middle East. However, the role that Chinese diplomacy played in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia closer together, and the China-brokered agreement signed between the two countries in 2023, have significantly altered this image of China’s foreign policy. How is China now dealing with the new security concerns in the region, especially following the earthquake—if we may use that term in the context of the Middle East, whose effects, of course, reach far beyond the region?

Gang Zheng: First of all, thank you very much, Mr. Omer. I would also like to express my appreciation and congratulations to the Rudaw Research Center for making this gathering possible. The Rudaw Corporation has made significant contributions to fostering understanding between China and the Middle East in recent years. They have established a Beijing office to cover news in China and now hold a long-term seat within media groups associated with China’s Foreign Ministry. Therefore, I believe the Rudaw Corporation is not only strengthening the relationship between China and Iraq, but also between the Kurdish people and the Chinese people. This is something I wanted to acknowledge before addressing the question posed by the moderator.

Currently, in China, we use the phrase "a change unseen in 100 years" to describe the significant transformations and uncertainties unfolding globally. As our colleagues have mentioned, these changes are profound. In the West, there is a similar sense of anxiety, with efforts to find the right terminology to describe the current situation in different regions, particularly in the Middle East. Some refer to it as a "post-Cold War" era, which reflects the difficulty in accurately defining the present state of affairs. I would like to share some personal observations regarding great power relations and their impact on the region.

At present, the hegemonic aspirations of extra-regional powers are at a historically low point. Compared to previous eras, major external powers exhibit fewer hegemonic ambitions toward this region. This shift presents both challenges and opportunities for regional powers. For instance, the United States, under President Donald Trump, showed minimal interest in the region. Compared to all U.S. presidents since World War II, perhaps only President Ronald Reagan shared a similar level of disengagement. Additionally, Russia's involvement in the region has seen a degree of retrenchment. As for China, it has long adhered to a policy of non-interference. Other major powers, such as the United Kingdom and France, also show diminishing hegemonic ambitions toward the Middle East.

This new dynamic offers an opportunity for regional actors to assume greater responsibility in shaping their own affairs. Some argue that without external hegemonic influence, power vacuums may emerge, leading to instability. However, I believe that in the absence of external interference, regional powers have a chance to find better ways to cooperate and foster a more stable neighborhood. Historically, during the Cold War era, certain countries acted with fewer risks, relying on the protection of powerful patrons. Today, with reduced external influence, regional states must act more cautiously and strategically.

One key area for testing this new dynamic is Syria. How regional powers collaborate to support a more inclusive government in Damascus will be critical in shaping the future of the region. As for China's stance on the new Syria, it is relatively straightforward. Rather than reiterating official rhetoric from Chinese diplomats and government officials, I will highlight a primary concern.

A crucial issue for China is the presence of jihadist fighters, including former Chinese nationals, who have been residing in Syria. With the fall of the Assad regime, some of these individuals have threatened to carry out attacks in China, as well as target Chinese assets, infrastructure projects, and businesses across the Middle East. If such threats remain mere rhetoric, it is one matter. However, if the Syrian government were to provide a safe haven for these elements, it would pose a significant problem for China’s engagement with Syria.

Nevertheless, if regional powers, with China’s involvement, can find effective solutions to address this security concern, China would be more than willing to participate in Syria’s reconstruction and support improved governance. China’s interest lies in fostering stability and facilitating the rebuilding process in Syria in a way that benefits the entire region.

Hussein Omer: Thank you. I will come back to you with a brief question, but for now, I will return to Dr. Jawad. The Kurds are a people living on their own land in Syria. They have played a significant role in the history of the Syrian state’s establishment, having sacrificed around 15,000 martyrs and 25,000 wounded in the war against ISIS. Currently, there is clear marginalization and neglect of the Kurds in Syria, along with a noticeable and strong push toward the centralization of the state. How do you think this marginalization of the Kurds will impact the future of the current political power in Damascus?

Jawad Anani: The solution we see as appropriate for Jordan is the same for Syria. This was reflected in the statement issued at the meeting of the parties in Syria a few days ago. While the statement did not directly address this issue, it spoke in general terms. "We want all parties representing Syria to be part of the process," said the spokesperson who read the final eighteen-point statement. No one was explicitly excluded from the process. However, the Kurdish brothers’ complaint is that they were not invited to the conference itself. I do not know why this happened—whether it was due to poor management, intentional actions, or some other reason. Perhaps you are more informed on this matter.

Hussein Omer: Regardless of the intentions or reasoning, what do you think will be the impact on Syria’s future if this marginalization continues in this way?

Jawad Anani: The truth is, as you know, the new Syrian president arrived in Amman today. He has arrived in Amman, and I believe the message being conveyed to him is that we in Jordan have a strong interest in seeing Syria become a peaceful and stable state, capable of managing its internal affairs without external interference. We oppose any Israeli occupation of Syrian territory. Israel has taken this opportunity to seize certain areas, to the point that they are no longer explicitly discussing abandoning them.

The reason, I believe, is that they now see the parties they must appease as the United States under the current administration, as well as some Western European countries. If you want to bring the United States and European countries to your side and gain their support, you should avoid doing anything that could upset them. This is my initial assessment of the situation. The second point that requires attention is whether Syria is now entirely under the control of the new regime, or if there are still areas causing problems. From what we've heard from our Turkish counterparts and possibly some other friends, there is concern that it is not yet fully under control. The evidence for this is that the regime is attempting to present the situation as if it has reached Latakia.

Hussein Omar: We also inquire about Latakia. Mr. Saeed, discussions are taking place regarding the Kurdish community, as well as the Alawite community, which is a significant group living on the Syrian coast and around western Homs. What is Iran's position on the Alawite community, and what role will they play in the future of Syria?

Saeed Khatibzadeh: Thank you very much. This is an important issue. Minorities have always been a concern in Syria, and they will continue to be. A significant number of minorities are represented, including many religious and ethnic groups, as well as various holy sites in Syria that hold religious significance for both Shiites and Alawites. However, the issue extends beyond this; no group should be neglected or marginalized.

This is not just about the Alawites—it also concerns the Sunni majority in Syria, who are not adequately included in the political process. Additionally, there is a peaceful opposition both inside and outside Syria, yet they, too, lack a voice. When the so-called interim government was formed, many of these groups were excluded. Even among the armed groups, only a limited number participated. Out of approximately 28 to 50 identified armed groups in Syria, only about 15 or 16 were involved in the process.

It now seems we have a minority-led High Defense System (HDS), with an active policy of legitimizing it. There is no fundamental issue with this itself, but the problem arises if we send the message that such a minority can govern a society as diverse—ethnically, religiously, and culturally—as Syria.

From Tehran’s perspective, the will of the people must be fully respected. The sooner we assist the Syrian government in becoming more inclusive, the better—not only for Syria but also for the stability of the entire region. Moreover, we must not overlook the risk of further security fragmentation in Syria, which remains a serious possibility. It is crucial that we act quickly to help Syria avoid yet another catastrophe.

Hussein Omar: Dr. Gang Zheng, a Syrian thinker, recently stated that it is impossible to create a religious state in Syria and provided one reason: China, in particular, is very sensitive to political Islam in power. Now, with the current regime, which you describe as jihadist or Islamic, is it possible to envision a normal Syrian-Chinese relationship under this regime?

Gang Zheng: I believe there have been conflicting signals coming from the new government in Syria. These signals seem to be pointing in different directions. Some have been very peaceful and cooperative, welcoming Chinese participation in the reconstruction process of post-Assad Syria. However, at the same time, there have been concerns regarding the appointment of some former militant groups—composed of individuals who were once Chinese nationals—into high-ranking positions within the new Syrian administration.

At this stage, it is difficult to determine how the relationship between China and Syria will evolve. In China, there is a saying: "Watch every step carefully before taking the next one," and I believe this approach applies here. I hope this situation can be resolved appropriately.

The latest development is that Ahmed al-Shara has met with the Chinese ambassador to Syria in Damascus. From my perspective, China is currently adopting a "trust but verify" approach to this issue before making any decisions about fully restoring relations with Syria.

Hussein Omar: Now, we have some time to take questions from the audience.

Question from the audience:
Dr. Jawad, question 1: What is Jordan's view on the political solution in Syria, and does it support the Syrian Constitutional Committee as a tool to reach a comprehensive agreement? Additionally, how do Jordan, or more broadly Arab countries, view the marginalization of religious and ethnic communities and their exclusion from current political movements in Syria? Is there an agreement with the Syrian government, or is there a different direction to achieve justice for all communities?

Jawad Anani:
First, any theory put forward between 2010 and 2016 suggesting that we should review the Sykes-Picot agreement and divide Arab countries into smaller states that respect the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, etc., has failed. I believe this model is now unreliable, even in the West, due to its many problems. Therefore, I think we will return to a unified state system, but there will be autonomy within these systems.

I think this is the closest model to what is being followed in Arab countries. As for Syria, Jordan and all other parties should be represented. In Jordan, in principle, we have no issue with universal representation. We have never been against it throughout history. Most Arab countries share this view; they do not want ethnic issues to become the primary cause of problems, as we saw in the 2000s, at the beginning of the Arab Spring and its continuation.

On the contrary, we advocate for full cooperation among all and a national unity that brings everyone together. Then, everyone is free to practice their religion, customs, or rituals. So, we absolutely believe in this in Jordan, and many Arab countries share this view.

Hussein Omar:
Thank you, Dr. I will take another question.

Sami Atroshi:
I would like to ask Saeed Khatibzadeh, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, regarding Syria. We know that Iran, Turkey, and even Arab countries have interests in Syria and Iraq and have been involved there. Of course, as a matter of policy or diplomacy, you cannot call it intervention, but in practice, we see their involvement in these regions. Why did Iran withdraw completely from Syria after the fall of the Ba'ath regime? Was Iran's support only for the Ba'ath regime and Bashar al-Assad, or would it also support the Syrian people, including the Alawites and Shiites? Why this complete withdrawal? Or, if such a situation occurred in Iraq, would Iran withdraw completely from the process, or would it continue to support certain parties in Iraq?

Saeed Khatibzadeh:
Thank you very much for your frank and important question. It deserves a proper response. We are all here because we have backgrounds in political science and international relations, and we are well aware of the relevant literature. Therefore, I do not want to delve too deeply into the analytical aspects of this issue. However, it is crucial to understand that any question must be contextualized. If we remove a fact from its historical and political context, it may not lead to the expected conclusions.

Why am I saying this? We are discussing Syria—a country with an established political structure, a government, and an internationally recognized administration. When Iran was invited to assist the Syrian government, it was a legitimate government in place. Iran's role in supporting the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Kurdish people—figures like Mam Jalal and others—stemmed from the same situation that unfolded in Syria: the emergence of Daesh (ISIS).

Iran played a pivotal role in defeating ISIS in this region. Iran’s actions were in the interest of the nations of this region because, from the very beginning, the primary question was: What would the post-Assad situation look like? Even in 2011 and 2013, when Daesh (ISIS) launched its operations and acts of aggression, many of the extremist jihadist groups involved were not nationalistic. They were not Syrian fighters but rather foreign, extra-regional militants. Some of these groups still exist today, which continues to pose a major challenge.

For Iran, the priority has always been ensuring that whatever emerges from this conflict does not become a threat to the region, nor does it enable the hegemonic ambitions of Israel, which has long sought to impose its dominance in the area. Iran's policy has been consistent: to assist those in need against those trying to impose their own agenda.

Iran remains committed to stability and peace in Syria. We have no other objective than to see an inclusive—or at the very least, semi-inclusive—government in Syria that guarantees the rights of minorities and the broader population. Having witnessed the collapse of political structures in both Afghanistan and Iraq, we understand the consequences. The people of this region have seen these collapses firsthand. When one of the largest armies in the Arab world—the Syrian army—disintegrates, the question arises: What is happening? Where is the Syrian army?

Is this in the best interest of the Syrian people? This is a collective responsibility, and we must work together to find a solution. Iran stands ready to support any genuine attempt to establish an inclusive government in Syria.

Question from the Audience:
You allowed three men to speak, and now let me speak for as long as half of them. I will speak in Kurdish because Kurdish is an official language in the Iraqi constitution. I am also a Kurdish teacher and a Kurdish Turasi teacher. Dr. Zheng, you are very lucky; you represent a strong state and are the biggest threat to the United States in terms of technology and trade. The United States sent you the coronavirus, and you overcame it. Thank you very much for your presence. You are representatives of three countries: Turkey, Iran, and others. The oldest nation—the Kurds—live with you. You have created a state on the land of these Kurds and in Kurdistan, yet you do not grant the Kurds their rights. Why shouldn't Kurds in Syria be allowed to study in Kurdish and have their Kurdish identity recognized? This is the first point. Where do you see the Kurdish issue in Syria heading?
We are connected to Persia; we share the Iranian language. Saeed, please be more open to the Iranian Kurds. I see through the parliament that the Kurds in your country are demanding their schools and universities be taught in Kurdish. I don’t understand why the Kurdish identity poses a threat to Iran, Syria, and Turkey.

Saeed Khatibzadeh:
For Iran, the Kurdish issue is not considered a problem, as Kurds are fully integrated into society. We have a province named Kurdistan, and in Tehran, there is a highway named Kurdistan.
Additionally, we have a Kurdish president who, as President Nechirvan Barzani mentioned, speaks Kurdish even better than Farsi, both in fluency and accent.
Therefore, for us, the Kurdish issue does not exist. We hope that all countries in this region respect the cultural and ethnic diversity within their borders.