Analysis

Following the Kurdish Unity and Solidarity Conference in Qamishli and the formation of a unified Kurdish delegation, the relationship between Damascus and Qamishli, on one hand, and the political and military relations in the Syrian Kurdish region have entered a phase of evident political deadlock. This deadlock raises a fundamental question: Is this a deliberate strategic choice adopted by both sides, or is it the result of failed negotiations and the loss of mutual will to reach some form of understanding? This comes at a time when constitutional drafting is expected to dominate the main platform of discussions and play a central role in drafting and addressing a set of issues, including determining the level of decentralization, the role of regional administrations, and ensuring Syria's non-return to centralized tyranny or fragmentation into approximate territories that threaten state unity.

It is planned that next week, Dana Gas and its partners will conduct the first initial pre-production gas testing of the Khor Mor natural gas production expansion project, known as KM250. Subsequently, they will move to the production phase, increasing daily production by 250 million cubic feet of gas to 540 million cubic feet of gas for the company's operations at the Khor Mor field. This will bring the level of natural gas production in the Kurdistan Region to over 1 billion cubic feet per day.

While eyes were on an anticipated meeting between SDF and Damascus” al-Sharaa” in Paris, news of fighting between them in southern Aleppo has been ongoing for two days. In reality, the March 10 agreement between al-Sharaa -Abdi is rapidly approaching a turning point, and this will either result in a compromise or, conversely, pave the way for a third brief internal Syrian war during the aL-Sharaa era, which seems likely to intensify along the Aleppo-Raqqa-Deir ez-Zor line. The events in Suwayda paved the way for a de facto autonomy for the Druze. Of course, it's unclear whether this will continue or end somewhere, but if the "al-Sharaa Administration" can quickly resolve the issue of SDF dissolution and the integration of administrative institutions with the state, then it can still have hope for building a central political system that stays away from a shadow and under an authoritarian president. In contrast, SDF feels that compared to pre-Suwayda events, the current situation is a golden opportunity or a last chance, so it speaks louder than before about its survival and political autonomy.

While this may be a data entry error, we are talking about a report published after two to three months, and an error of one zero less or more means changing thousands to millions. After correcting the data, it was noted that there was an error in April 2025 data where the same figures from March 2025 were entered for revenues. In May 2025, everything was combined. What draws attention in the data correction is the decrease in revenues during these five months, whether oil or non-oil revenues.

From July 14-16, 2025, oil fields on the borders of Erbil and Duhok provinces were targeted by bombing drones. Until now, drone attacks on various borders of these two provinces continue, and the number is increasing day by day, despite condemnations from America, Iraq, and demands from the Kurdistan Region to stop the attacks.

On the morning of July 15, 2025, the Sarsang oil field was attacked by a drone. The American company HKN, which operates the field and owns 62% of its shares, is the main stakeholder. On the same day, just hours later, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil officially announced the signing ceremony of the contract between HKN and the North Oil Company for the development of the Hamrin oil field, with a daily production capacity of 60,000 barrels of oil and 45 to 50 million cubic feet of gas.

Iraq and the Kurdistan Region have faced a major crisis from both external and internal dimensions: the water scarcity crisis. At present, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region are confronting an unprecedented threat of drought in their history, particularly as the annual renewable water availability per individual is currently approximately 600 cubic meters and is expected to decrease by half or more in the coming decade.

Öcalan has led the PKK for more than 46 years, beginning at the age of 30, and this may be one of the key factors behind his political transformation. His experience lends weight to the age theory in civil war outcomes, which posits that as the leaders of armed groups grow older, they become more inclined toward peace and more focused on the legacy they leave behind, rather than on prolonging the conflict. This mirrors the shift made by Yasser Arafat in Palestine toward the end of his life. In practice, Öcalan’s transformation could mark an important step toward ending a prolonged conflict and opening a new chapter in Kurdish politics in Turkey. However, it remains unclear whether this effort will ultimately succeed.

Undoubtedly, the 12-day Israel–Iran war stands as one of the most consequential events of the first quarter of the 21st century, with the potential to reshape both the economic landscape and the political-security dynamics of Western Asia. Much like the Six-Day Arab–Israeli War of 1967, which extended beyond mere territorial occupation, the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel was not solely about missile exchanges and nuclear ambitions.

This crisis has once again deepened, and the rhetoric between Erbil and Baghdad has escalated into mutual accusations. These tensions will inevitably have consequences, both immediate and long-term—whether through the repetition of temporary solutions or the emergence of a new approach. However, a decision from the Federal Court alone cannot resolve this persistent crisis between Erbil and Baghdad, nor can the fate of these financial disputes be postponed until after the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025. Instead, all financial issues must be addressed transparently, based on the numbers and data from Iraq’s Ministry of Finance. In this report, we present both the relevant figures and two fundamental options for resolving this ongoing dispute.

On May 19, 2025, the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Kurdistan Regional Government signed two contracts in Washington for the development of both the Miran and Kurdamir fields with HKN and Western Zagros. Four months before that date, Iraq's Ministry of Oil signed a memorandum of understanding in London for the development of four Kirkuk oil fields with British BP, and subsequently, on February 26 and March 26, 2025, all contracts were signed for BP to begin operations in Kirkuk.

The Kurdistan Region has the capacity to produce over 6,700 megawatts of electricity and currently generates 4,300 megawatts, indicating it still has the potential to produce an additional 2,400 megawatts. In the event of an interruption in Iranian electricity and gas supplies due to American pressure, Iraq could benefit from this surplus, just as it presently purchases 1,600 megawatts from the Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, the Kurdistan Region is expected to make a significant advancement in gas production early next year, reaching one billion cubic meters. Whether Iraq opts to purchase the gas directly or it is converted to electricity for export, Iraq can rely on the Kurdistan Region in this regard.

Following the change of the Baath regime in Syria, on one hand, Ahmed al-Sharaa and HTS wanted to convey the message that they would establish a political system different from the previous one. Not only would that, but the previous behaviors of HTS also change. Al-Jolani removed his name and promised to dissolve his organization as well. The majority of people were pleased with the end of the family and dictatorial rule that had lasted for decades under the Baath government and Assad's regime. The new situation created hope that this change would end the 13-year-long internal conflict, monopoly, and civil war; especially minority groups, considering the reformist rhetoric and promises of the new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa, did not think the potential for diversity and political stability there was far-fetched.

Trump's two-month deadline for an agreement or confrontation with Iran, the Iranian leader's hope that in the future "by divine grace" a miracle will occur and his opponents will fall, Turkey's rush to dismantle the PKK, Qandil's requests for "an appropriate opportunity" to hold a congress, or Ahmed Shara's initiatives for "rebuilding Syria" - all these express that in the current geopolitical issues of the Middle East, accelerating, speediness or moving slowly has become a strategic option.

In 2023, 214 oil production fields and oil refinery locations were identified in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region that had high temperature and carbon dioxide emission density levels, which was a result of the burning of associated gas from these locations. During field visits to these sites located in the governorates of the Kurdistan Region, it was observed that the amounts reported in the data reflected the intensity and density of the flames from the pipes that were installed for burning the gas.

Many countries around the world have expressed their positions on the possibility of a war between Iran and the United States, indicating that the world sees it as more than just a war of words. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has stated that he does not believe attacks from abroad will occur, but that Iran will respond strongly if they do. Militarily, this suggests that Iran has prepared for war, just as the United States is deploying aircraft and weapons to its military bases and allies in the Middle East. Alongside Iranian officials, the resistance front has intensified its rhetoric against the United States, and some Iraqi officials have warned that any potential conflict would draw them in and devastate the region.

Today, water scarcity, extreme temperatures, and desertification threaten an astonishing percent of Iraq’s agricultural land, resulting in increasing rates of crop failures. In a 2023 study by the Norwegian Refugee Council, 60 percent of farmers interviewed said they cultivated less land or had to use less water due to extreme drought. In 2023, Iraq reported a decline in the harvest of 8 out of the top 10 crops, including vegetables and legumes.

All eyes were on the tripartite meeting in Baghdad that took place last week between international oil companies (IOC) and officials from Erbil and Baghdad, which ended without results. This comes after Baghdad had previously announced that the resumption of Kurdistan Region oil exports via pipeline would happen in the coming hours. This did not happen because the international oil companies that have invested in the Kurdistan Region and produce approximately two-thirds of the total Kurdistan Region oil are not willing to put oil into the pipeline under the current terms agreed upon between Baghdad and Erbil.

The 8-point agreement between Syria and the SDF marks an important historical turning point for the future of Syria. Hypothetically speaking, the gains that Kurds might achieve through this agreement could be less than what happened since 2011. However, given the current circumstances, it represents a significant win, especially considering that this is the first time in recent history that a Syrian authority has acknowledged Kurdish identity and their political and military participation. For Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, this agreement is also a victory. It allows him to approach future challenges with a calmer mindset, especially since the deal affirms the supremacy of Syria’s interim government in the main pillars of SDF-controlled areas, which had previously been a potential source of conflict. Given the events of the past few days in Syria's coastal areas, where hundreds were killed, and the growing threat of extremist Islamic groups, many countries are reluctant to see the authority of al-Sharaa’s Syria become centralized. At the same time, for SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, considering Öcalan's message, the evolving situation in Syria, and pressure from the United States and the international coalition, this agreement is the best available option.

These days, many parties are placing their bets on a potential message from Abdullah Öcalan regarding the PKK's disarmament—an announcement that is reportedly imminent and could be released in the coming days. If confirmed, this could mark a turning point in the 40-year conflict between the PKK and Turkey. However, achieving immediate disarmament remains a significant challenge. In its latest statement, the PKK has signaled a willingness to support Öcalan’s decision, declaring, “We will change ourselves.” At the same time, it cautioned that the process will not happen overnight. While this development could serve as a starting point for disarmament, Turkey's complex internal and external dynamics make the path forward both possible and highly challenging. The question of disarmament—or the PKK’s continued existence—has the potential to reshape political and military balances far beyond Turkey, influencing the broader West Asian region. In the wake of the October 7 events and Bashar al-Assad’s declining grip on power, the region is undergoing a fundamental transformation. As a result, this issue cannot be viewed solely as Turkey’s internal affair.

Most likely, the countries' "Great Game" in present-day Syria will have a significant impact on reshaping the power balances in West Asia. Syria in the era of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani is the intersection point of three major regional geopolitical projects: the dream of Greater Turkey that Erdogan has been talking about for years, the Iranian-Shiite Resistance Axis, and the Israeli project! This runs parallel with the global power game that has now spread across Asia-Pacific, the North Pole, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Similar to the years following World War I, everyone is struggling to find their place in these great games. Regarding the Kurds, unlike before when they were left out of the games, there are now more opportunities available for the Kurds than before, and perhaps Assad's fall might open the door to a Kurdish spring, although the risks of history repeating itself are not small.