Analysis

<!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>One year after the launch of the Runaki Project—an ambitious, region-wide initiative designed to provide 24-hour, uninterrupted electricity across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq—approximately 70 percent of the region’s population is now receiving continuous power through the program.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph --> <!-- wp:paragraph --> <p>The Runaki Project marks a significant milestone in the Kurdistan Regional Government’s efforts to modernize the energy sector, reduce dependence on small private diesel generators, and minimize environmental pollution resulting from fragmented power production.</p> <!-- /wp:paragraph -->

On September 27, 2025, the pipeline for exporting oil from the Kurdistan Region to European, Asian, and U.S. markets via the Port of Ceyhan was reopened. Over the past month, an average of 188,221 barrels per day of oil from Kurdistan Region fields reached buyers.

This reassurance from the Central Bank and the Prime Minister of Iraq comes at a time when, a decade and a half ago, Iraq’s external debt stood at $60.9 billion, and its domestic debt was $9.9 billion. By June 31, 2025, however, domestic debt had risen to $67.2 billion, while external debt had declined to $14.45 billion. These shifts and reversals are noteworthy and highlight several important aspects of Iraq’s economy. The key question now is whether the issue of government debt has become part of the election campaign rhetoric or if it represents a genuine threat to the country’s financial and economic stability in the future.

Exactly one year ago today, on a day much like this one, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of Türkiye’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), delivered a speech in parliament that marked the beginning of a new phase in the ongoing conflict between the PKK and the state, a process that continues to this day.

On November 11, 2025, citizens of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region will head to the polls to elect members for the sixth parliamentary term. The annual cost of maintaining this parliament is approaching half a billion U.S. dollars.

These days, a range of phrases are being made about the upcoming elections. Nouri al-Maliki has declared that abstaining from participation is akin to surrendering to “Satan”, while Hadi al-Amiri has described it as a “battle for survival.” Qais al-Khazali has warned of a “dangerous project for Iraq,” urging people to participate—directly opposing Muqtada al-Sadr’s call for a boycott. However, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has adopted a different tone, appealing to voters to let him complete his “unfinished work.” Ultimately, these slogans all share the same goal: to draw people to the ballot boxes—one of the greatest challenges of this election. Yet that is not the only concern. The central question is Iraq is heading toward elections amid a state of strategic uncertainty.

Wood Mackenzie has been tasked with reviewing production costs, investment levels, and profit margins per barrel of oil for international companies operating in the Kurdistan Region. Based on this review, Baghdad will allocate the companies’ financial entitlements for both the current and future phases.

On the morning of September 27, 2025, Kurdistan Region oil was exported via pipeline to the Ceyhan port. This tripartite agreement will directly impact the entire energy sector in both Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, even as three unresolved files remain suspended for 2026.

According to the Global Inequality Dashboard, which compiles data from 110 countries worldwide, Iraq ranks among the most unequal nations in terms of income and wealth distribution. The top 1% of the population earns three times more than the 45%, highlighting deep structural imbalances. A key driver of this inequality is the public sector, particularly in the way salaries are allocated.

The number of civil servants appointed to Iraq’s public sector over the past year—whose salaries are paid by the Ministry of Finance—has exceeded one million. This figure comes in addition to the individuals added to the country’s social safety net during the same period.

Following the Kurdish Unity and Solidarity Conference in Qamishli and the formation of a unified Kurdish delegation, the relationship between Damascus and Qamishli, on one hand, and the political and military relations in the Syrian Kurdish region have entered a phase of evident political deadlock. This deadlock raises a fundamental question: Is this a deliberate strategic choice adopted by both sides, or is it the result of failed negotiations and the loss of mutual will to reach some form of understanding? This comes at a time when constitutional drafting is expected to dominate the main platform of discussions and play a central role in drafting and addressing a set of issues, including determining the level of decentralization, the role of regional administrations, and ensuring Syria's non-return to centralized tyranny or fragmentation into approximate territories that threaten state unity.

It is planned that next week, Dana Gas and its partners will conduct the first initial pre-production gas testing of the Khor Mor natural gas production expansion project, known as KM250. Subsequently, they will move to the production phase, increasing daily production by 250 million cubic feet of gas to 540 million cubic feet of gas for the company's operations at the Khor Mor field. This will bring the level of natural gas production in the Kurdistan Region to over 1 billion cubic feet per day.

While eyes were on an anticipated meeting between SDF and Damascus” al-Sharaa” in Paris, news of fighting between them in southern Aleppo has been ongoing for two days. In reality, the March 10 agreement between al-Sharaa -Abdi is rapidly approaching a turning point, and this will either result in a compromise or, conversely, pave the way for a third brief internal Syrian war during the aL-Sharaa era, which seems likely to intensify along the Aleppo-Raqqa-Deir ez-Zor line. The events in Suwayda paved the way for a de facto autonomy for the Druze. Of course, it's unclear whether this will continue or end somewhere, but if the "al-Sharaa Administration" can quickly resolve the issue of SDF dissolution and the integration of administrative institutions with the state, then it can still have hope for building a central political system that stays away from a shadow and under an authoritarian president. In contrast, SDF feels that compared to pre-Suwayda events, the current situation is a golden opportunity or a last chance, so it speaks louder than before about its survival and political autonomy.

While this may be a data entry error, we are talking about a report published after two to three months, and an error of one zero less or more means changing thousands to millions. After correcting the data, it was noted that there was an error in April 2025 data where the same figures from March 2025 were entered for revenues. In May 2025, everything was combined. What draws attention in the data correction is the decrease in revenues during these five months, whether oil or non-oil revenues.

From July 14-16, 2025, oil fields on the borders of Erbil and Duhok provinces were targeted by bombing drones. Until now, drone attacks on various borders of these two provinces continue, and the number is increasing day by day, despite condemnations from America, Iraq, and demands from the Kurdistan Region to stop the attacks.

On the morning of July 15, 2025, the Sarsang oil field was attacked by a drone. The American company HKN, which operates the field and owns 62% of its shares, is the main stakeholder. On the same day, just hours later, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil officially announced the signing ceremony of the contract between HKN and the North Oil Company for the development of the Hamrin oil field, with a daily production capacity of 60,000 barrels of oil and 45 to 50 million cubic feet of gas.

Iraq and the Kurdistan Region have faced a major crisis from both external and internal dimensions: the water scarcity crisis. At present, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region are confronting an unprecedented threat of drought in their history, particularly as the annual renewable water availability per individual is currently approximately 600 cubic meters and is expected to decrease by half or more in the coming decade.

Öcalan has led the PKK for more than 46 years, beginning at the age of 30, and this may be one of the key factors behind his political transformation. His experience lends weight to the age theory in civil war outcomes, which posits that as the leaders of armed groups grow older, they become more inclined toward peace and more focused on the legacy they leave behind, rather than on prolonging the conflict. This mirrors the shift made by Yasser Arafat in Palestine toward the end of his life. In practice, Öcalan’s transformation could mark an important step toward ending a prolonged conflict and opening a new chapter in Kurdish politics in Turkey. However, it remains unclear whether this effort will ultimately succeed.

Undoubtedly, the 12-day Israel–Iran war stands as one of the most consequential events of the first quarter of the 21st century, with the potential to reshape both the economic landscape and the political-security dynamics of Western Asia. Much like the Six-Day Arab–Israeli War of 1967, which extended beyond mere territorial occupation, the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel was not solely about missile exchanges and nuclear ambitions.

This crisis has once again deepened, and the rhetoric between Erbil and Baghdad has escalated into mutual accusations. These tensions will inevitably have consequences, both immediate and long-term—whether through the repetition of temporary solutions or the emergence of a new approach. However, a decision from the Federal Court alone cannot resolve this persistent crisis between Erbil and Baghdad, nor can the fate of these financial disputes be postponed until after the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025. Instead, all financial issues must be addressed transparently, based on the numbers and data from Iraq’s Ministry of Finance. In this report, we present both the relevant figures and two fundamental options for resolving this ongoing dispute.

On May 19, 2025, the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Kurdistan Regional Government signed two contracts in Washington for the development of both the Miran and Kurdamir fields with HKN and Western Zagros. Four months before that date, Iraq's Ministry of Oil signed a memorandum of understanding in London for the development of four Kirkuk oil fields with British BP, and subsequently, on February 26 and March 26, 2025, all contracts were signed for BP to begin operations in Kirkuk.