Analysis

This crisis has once again deepened, and the rhetoric between Erbil and Baghdad has escalated into mutual accusations. These tensions will inevitably have consequences, both immediate and long-term—whether through the repetition of temporary solutions or the emergence of a new approach. However, a decision from the Federal Court alone cannot resolve this persistent crisis between Erbil and Baghdad, nor can the fate of these financial disputes be postponed until after the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025. Instead, all financial issues must be addressed transparently, based on the numbers and data from Iraq’s Ministry of Finance. In this report, we present both the relevant figures and two fundamental options for resolving this ongoing dispute.

On May 19, 2025, the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Kurdistan Regional Government signed two contracts in Washington for the development of both the Miran and Kurdamir fields with HKN and Western Zagros. Four months before that date, Iraq's Ministry of Oil signed a memorandum of understanding in London for the development of four Kirkuk oil fields with British BP, and subsequently, on February 26 and March 26, 2025, all contracts were signed for BP to begin operations in Kirkuk.

The Kurdistan Region has the capacity to produce over 6,700 megawatts of electricity and currently generates 4,300 megawatts, indicating it still has the potential to produce an additional 2,400 megawatts. In the event of an interruption in Iranian electricity and gas supplies due to American pressure, Iraq could benefit from this surplus, just as it presently purchases 1,600 megawatts from the Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, the Kurdistan Region is expected to make a significant advancement in gas production early next year, reaching one billion cubic meters. Whether Iraq opts to purchase the gas directly or it is converted to electricity for export, Iraq can rely on the Kurdistan Region in this regard.

Following the change of the Baath regime in Syria, on one hand, Ahmed al-Sharaa and HTS wanted to convey the message that they would establish a political system different from the previous one. Not only would that, but the previous behaviors of HTS also change. Al-Jolani removed his name and promised to dissolve his organization as well. The majority of people were pleased with the end of the family and dictatorial rule that had lasted for decades under the Baath government and Assad's regime. The new situation created hope that this change would end the 13-year-long internal conflict, monopoly, and civil war; especially minority groups, considering the reformist rhetoric and promises of the new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa, did not think the potential for diversity and political stability there was far-fetched.

Trump's two-month deadline for an agreement or confrontation with Iran, the Iranian leader's hope that in the future "by divine grace" a miracle will occur and his opponents will fall, Turkey's rush to dismantle the PKK, Qandil's requests for "an appropriate opportunity" to hold a congress, or Ahmed Shara's initiatives for "rebuilding Syria" - all these express that in the current geopolitical issues of the Middle East, accelerating, speediness or moving slowly has become a strategic option.

In 2023, 214 oil production fields and oil refinery locations were identified in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region that had high temperature and carbon dioxide emission density levels, which was a result of the burning of associated gas from these locations. During field visits to these sites located in the governorates of the Kurdistan Region, it was observed that the amounts reported in the data reflected the intensity and density of the flames from the pipes that were installed for burning the gas.

Many countries around the world have expressed their positions on the possibility of a war between Iran and the United States, indicating that the world sees it as more than just a war of words. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has stated that he does not believe attacks from abroad will occur, but that Iran will respond strongly if they do. Militarily, this suggests that Iran has prepared for war, just as the United States is deploying aircraft and weapons to its military bases and allies in the Middle East. Alongside Iranian officials, the resistance front has intensified its rhetoric against the United States, and some Iraqi officials have warned that any potential conflict would draw them in and devastate the region.

Today, water scarcity, extreme temperatures, and desertification threaten an astonishing percent of Iraq’s agricultural land, resulting in increasing rates of crop failures. In a 2023 study by the Norwegian Refugee Council, 60 percent of farmers interviewed said they cultivated less land or had to use less water due to extreme drought. In 2023, Iraq reported a decline in the harvest of 8 out of the top 10 crops, including vegetables and legumes.

All eyes were on the tripartite meeting in Baghdad that took place last week between international oil companies (IOC) and officials from Erbil and Baghdad, which ended without results. This comes after Baghdad had previously announced that the resumption of Kurdistan Region oil exports via pipeline would happen in the coming hours. This did not happen because the international oil companies that have invested in the Kurdistan Region and produce approximately two-thirds of the total Kurdistan Region oil are not willing to put oil into the pipeline under the current terms agreed upon between Baghdad and Erbil.

The 8-point agreement between Syria and the SDF marks an important historical turning point for the future of Syria. Hypothetically speaking, the gains that Kurds might achieve through this agreement could be less than what happened since 2011. However, given the current circumstances, it represents a significant win, especially considering that this is the first time in recent history that a Syrian authority has acknowledged Kurdish identity and their political and military participation. For Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, this agreement is also a victory. It allows him to approach future challenges with a calmer mindset, especially since the deal affirms the supremacy of Syria’s interim government in the main pillars of SDF-controlled areas, which had previously been a potential source of conflict. Given the events of the past few days in Syria's coastal areas, where hundreds were killed, and the growing threat of extremist Islamic groups, many countries are reluctant to see the authority of al-Sharaa’s Syria become centralized. At the same time, for SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, considering Öcalan's message, the evolving situation in Syria, and pressure from the United States and the international coalition, this agreement is the best available option.

These days, many parties are placing their bets on a potential message from Abdullah Öcalan regarding the PKK's disarmament—an announcement that is reportedly imminent and could be released in the coming days. If confirmed, this could mark a turning point in the 40-year conflict between the PKK and Turkey. However, achieving immediate disarmament remains a significant challenge. In its latest statement, the PKK has signaled a willingness to support Öcalan’s decision, declaring, “We will change ourselves.” At the same time, it cautioned that the process will not happen overnight. While this development could serve as a starting point for disarmament, Turkey's complex internal and external dynamics make the path forward both possible and highly challenging. The question of disarmament—or the PKK’s continued existence—has the potential to reshape political and military balances far beyond Turkey, influencing the broader West Asian region. In the wake of the October 7 events and Bashar al-Assad’s declining grip on power, the region is undergoing a fundamental transformation. As a result, this issue cannot be viewed solely as Turkey’s internal affair.

Most likely, the countries' "Great Game" in present-day Syria will have a significant impact on reshaping the power balances in West Asia. Syria in the era of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani is the intersection point of three major regional geopolitical projects: the dream of Greater Turkey that Erdogan has been talking about for years, the Iranian-Shiite Resistance Axis, and the Israeli project! This runs parallel with the global power game that has now spread across Asia-Pacific, the North Pole, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Similar to the years following World War I, everyone is struggling to find their place in these great games. Regarding the Kurds, unlike before when they were left out of the games, there are now more opportunities available for the Kurds than before, and perhaps Assad's fall might open the door to a Kurdish spring, although the risks of history repeating itself are not small.

Beyond the importance of the disputes between Erbil and Baghdad on this issue, there are two other important questions: Iraq's perspective on energy issues (oil and gas), and the importance of Kirkuk's oil reserves and BP's continuous efforts to invest in Kirkuk's oil fields during the era of net zero and transition to renewable energy

The amount of money sold, domestically and internationally, by the Central Bank in dollars this year has exceeded $62 billion, resulting in the receipt of dinars in equivalent proportion, averaging approximately 80.6 trillion dinars for the year. Non-oil revenues generated from taxes, fees, and customs by the end of October 2024 amounted to 14.3 trillion dinars. Combined, these revenues total around 95 trillion dinars. However, by the end of October, Iraq's total expenditures had reached 122 trillion dinars. With two months of expenditures still unaccounted for, it is evident that the dinar reserves derived from oil-based dollar revenues have been exhausted.

The causes of depreciation in neighboring currencies vary. The decline of the Iranian rial is attributed to external factors, including US and European sanctions. The Turkish lira's depreciation stems from a growing fiscal deficit, budget imbalances, and political stances taken by the AKP in response to regional developments. Meanwhile, the collapse of the Syrian pound can be traced to ongoing war, instability, economic sanctions, and uncertainty surrounding the emerging Jolani-led state. Why does the Iraqi currency fluctuate daily in the market, consistently trading at over 20,000 dinars above the Central Bank's official rate for every $100?

Considering the experience of previous Turkish operations in the Jarablus-Bab, Afrin and Sarê Kani lines—one lasting about two months, another eight days, and the third approximately seven months—and given that three sides of Kobane are now occupied and its area is limited, it can be said that if Turkey wishes to invade Kobane, it could occupy the city relatively quickly. However, Turkey's task may not be easy due to SDF's defensive preparations, such as tunnels and other defensive measures, as well as the use of drones. Despite these challenges, Turkey could ultimately invade the city. Yet, it does not appear eager to do so because:

Frankly, while I and many others did not expect significant resistance from areas with a predominantly Sunni population, I anticipated fierce resistance along the coastal strip of Damascus and Homs, where the Alawite population is dense. This was because I thought the Alawite, Christian, and Druze communities, knowing that radical jihadist groups would not grant them the right to live, would resist more fiercely than anyone else. Furthermore, the coastal region held strategic importance for Russia. Since 2015, Russia, which has played a decisive role in the Syrian civil war, has a naval base in Tartus on the coastal strip and an airbase slightly further north in Hmeimim. However, contrary to expectations, neither Russia nor Assad’s forces showed any resistance, and the entire country fell into the hands of HTS and its allies within a few days.

Less than a month ago, Assad, in the Arab League, was confidently advising the leaders of Islamic countries on what to do. This situation seems to confirm the well-known saying, "In totalitarian regimes, everything seems normal until 15 minutes before they collapse." Indeed, it was just 15 minutes before Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies captured Aleppo on November 27, followed by the rapid fall of other cities, like a line of falling dominoes.

The census in Iraq is not merely a statistical exercise; it carries significant political implications related to the distribution of power and wealth among communities. Conflicted areas, particularly between the central government and the Kurdistan Region, posed major challenges. Some questioned the impartiality of the process, while others suspected it was an attempt to alter the demographics of certain regions.

The three-year Iraqi budget provided a comprehensive framework for the country’s revenues and expenditures based on initial estimates. However, the recent census has corrected these estimates, revealing significant discrepancies. As the time approaches to amend and approve the 2025 budget tables, it is imperative to review expenditures, provincial allocations, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) budget, and revenue projections.

The possibility of an Israeli attack on at least six Iraqi armed groups has become a prominent topic following a letter from Israeli Foreign Minister to the UN Security Council President, Barbara Woodward. The pressing question now is whether Israel will proceed with an attack. Israel has asserted its right to retaliate due to the escalation and increased frequency of attacks by Islamic Resistance groups in Iraq. This comes at a time when war is the last thing the Iraqi Prime Minister wants. With less than a year to the next elections, he is focused on advancing significant economic and political projects, all while aiming to secure his position in office. In 2024, despite various challenges and external influences, he managed to declare an informal ceasefire between the United States and Iraqi armed groups and found a moderate resolution to the contentious issue of U.S. troop presence. Regarding the tensions between Israel and Islamic Resistance groups, the Prime Minister has, at the very least, managed to publicly distance the groups involved in his government from these conflicts. This raises another crucial question: why has Israel chosen this particular moment to bring its complaint to the international stage?