The Iraqi Ministry of Electricity has reiterated its intention to purchase gas from the KRG in the upcoming months. Dana Gas previously announced the completion of an additional 250 million cubic feet of gas production, slated for availability in the second quarter of this year. However, it remains uncertain whether this supply will be allocated for power plants within the Kurdistan Region or Iraq at large.
In the Kurdistan Region, it's widely understood that elections cannot proceed without the KDP, just as they are incomplete without the PUK. Moreover, the potential absence of the KDP from the elections could trigger a chain of events impacting the security of the development road, and Iraq as a whole.
Throughout the suspension period, the estimated loss surpasses $11 billion if the Kurdistan Region were to sell its own oil independently, escalating to $13 billion if Baghdad were to market it at the price of Iraqi oil exports in 2023.
This rapid acceleration in housing development is not confined to Erbil; it is a trend observed across the Kurdistan Region. In Sulaimani, for instance, the number of real estate investment projects currently underway has surged two to threefold compared to previous years, reflecting the region's robust growth and burgeoning housing market.
In terms of revenue, the budget projected Iraq's total revenue in 2023 to reach 134.5 trillion dinars, comprising 117.2 trillion dinars from oil revenue and 17.3 trillion dinars from non-oil revenue. However, according to the Ministry of Finance's annual report, Iraq's total oil and non-oil revenues amounted to 135.6 trillion dinars, with oil revenues at 125.8 trillion dinars and non-oil revenues at 9.7 trillion dinars.
Following French President Emmanuel Macron's call for direct military involvement in the Ukraine conflict, Putin issued a stark warning: 'We also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory.' This statement suggested the potential deployment of tactical nuclear missiles should the conflict escalate.
Numerous Russian ports contend with challenges posed by ice and cold weather or rely on narrow straits controlled by other nations for access to the open sea. For example, Vladivostok, Russia's largest port, connects to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Japan, an area with ties to the United States. Moreover, this crucial port faces a four-month closure each year, and the absence of icebreakers would severely impede Russia's operations and trade. On the western front, Russian warships departing from St. Petersburg can navigate the Baltic Sea to reach the Atlantic Ocean. However, they must traverse the narrow Strait of Oresund, situated between Sweden and Denmark, adding to logistical complexities.
China's trade with Iraq has consistently expanded year after year, with recent figures nearing $50 billion, representing over two-thirds of Iraq's exports to China. Moreover, China's investments in Iraq's energy and real estate sectors have surpassed those of neighboring countries over the last two decades.
After several days of anticipation and amidst intense political and legal debates, the councils of 13 Iraqi provinces, with the exception of Kirkuk and Diyala, finally elected their governors. However, despite the issuance of a decree by the presidency to appoint the elected governors, except for Salahaddin province, it's apparent that this move won't resolve the internal tensions within local governments.
Last year, based on IOC reports and gathered data, oil production in the Kurdistan Region fell short of 100 million barrels, marking a significant decline from the 158 million barrels produced across all fields in 2022. This represented a staggering 42 percent decrease in oil production and a corresponding 67 percent reduction in revenues compared to the previous year.
Despite SOMO's preliminary and final data on export oil revenues showing a $48 million difference, there remains a staggering billion-dollar gap between the Iraqi Finance Ministry's report and that of SOMO and the Iraqi Oil Ministry. This disparity exceeded $4 billion in 2023.
Indeed, the policy of refraining from responding to the attacks on non-Americans in the Kurdistan Region contrasts with the US humanitarian intervention in the 1990s and the significant role played against ISIS, especially crucial for the Kurds. The current administration's stance prompts the question of whether there is a shift in that policy.
Beyond alleged security concerns, Iran's true objective appears to be destabilizing the Kurdistan Region, impacting key sectors like real estate and energy.
Under heightened scrutiny following attacks in Gaza, Kerman, and the Red Sea, Iran is compelled to address these pressures. The Iranian authorities, seeking justifications for themselves and their regional proxies, engage in a nuanced strategy. While Iran persists in indirect attacks through proxies in Iraq, instances where it directly acknowledges responsibility and releases imagery aim to assert its capability, ownership, and use of ballistic missiles.
Following the visit of the Kurdistan Region's president, a noteworthy development emerged as the Iraqi Council of Ministers opted to allocate a portion of the budget for the Kurdistan Regional Government. While the issue of the budget between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region may persist, especially amid the ongoing crisis, there exist compelling reasons to explore at least a moderate solution at this juncture.
This issue has broader implications, including US-Iraq relations and US economic sanctions against other countries. Actions and warnings from the Americans alone depreciated the Iraqi dinar against the dollar, despite efforts by the Iraqi government and the central bank to increase the dinar value. Despite adjustments, it still trades above 1,540 dinars per dollar in the markets, highlighting the significant impact of American statements on Iraq's economic situation.
Aside from the potential for demonstrations and tensions, one of the most likely scenarios for the Sadr movement is a significant comeback in the 2025 elections. According to this scenario, the Sadrists, as an opposition, could mobilize a surge of voters to the polls, outpacing their rivals.
The series of declines in voter turnout follows the tradition of the previous four terms, as shown: in the 2005 elections: 76%, in 2010: 62%, in 2014: 61%, in 2018: 44%, and in 2021: 43%.
Iraq plans to increase its refinery capacity to 1.25 million barrels of crude oil in the coming years. Apart from its five official refineries, the Kurdistan Region owns dozens of small and medium-sized unofficial refineries in Erbil, Sulaimani, and Duhok provinces. Collectively, these facilities currently refine over 286,000 barrels of crude oil daily, exporting their products to domestic markets.
Approximately 6.6 million voters participated in the Iraqi provincial council elections, 41% of those eligible to vote. However, with a total of more than 26 million voters, this election and its results represent approximately 25% of all eligible voters. The significance lies not solely in reflecting voter will but in its potential to drive crucial political developments
The upcoming December 18, 2023, provincial elections pose a crucial choice for the new Iraqi civilian forces aligning with the October 2019 demonstrations. It's a dilemma between potential further decline or the chance to secure a popular base and influence within local councils. Success in these elections could pave the way for increased support in the 2025 parliamentary elections, while failure might have the opposite effect.
