Sarah Sanbar:
Good morning, everyone. Thank you all for being here and for being such dedicated early risers. I hope you've had your tea or coffee and are ready for another day of engaging panels. It’s a great honor to be here today to speak about human rights and climate change and their effects in Iraq. I am joined by a fantastic panel, which includes members from civil society, government, and experts who will share their knowledge with you.

When we think about climate change, we often see it as an issue in and of itself. I’ve had a few people ask me about the links between human rights and climate change. The truth is that climate change impacts a wide range of human rights—everything from the right to water, and the right to health, to housing, security, and stability.

Today, the panelists will discuss some of the impacts we are already witnessing in Iraq due to climate change. I will also aim to end on a more positive note, focusing on solutions and steps we can take moving forward.

To start, I’d like to introduce Mr. Jasim Al-Asadi, the founder and head of the Iraqi Nature Organization, a remarkable organization that has been especially active in the southern marshes. The southern marshes have faced significant impacts due to both climate change and environmental degradation. Mr. Al-Asadi, could you begin by sharing some of the effects you've observed in the southern marshes and how these are impacting the lives of people in the region?

Jasim Asadi: The marshes, or wetlands, of southern Iraq consist of three main marshes, along with several smaller wetlands. The total area of these three marshes historically was about 9,650 square kilometers, and during flood seasons, it can reach more than 20,000 square kilometers. This is equivalent to the area of a country like Lebanon and is larger than the combined area of 27 other countries in the world. This region has a rich history of biodiversity and human settlement, dating back to ancient times, with its roots tracing back to the Sumerians. In fact, there are more than 270 words used by the local inhabitants of these areas that are derived from Sumerian, Akkadian, and Aramaic, not Arabic. Additionally, their behaviors and traditions in many aspects are Sumerian in origin.

These marshes underwent unprecedented destruction and drying from 1991 to 2003, and most of the area turned into desert. The local inhabitants of these wetlands and marshes migrated to various regions, most notably to western Iraq and abroad. We have a community of buffalo herders, who were unable to read or write in Arabic, but today live in cities such as Detroit and speak English. Others have migrated to the Netherlands, Sweden, and Australia, with a large community now residing in Sydney.

The marshes gradually began to recover after 2003, but the Iraqi government played no role in their revival. There was no plan for revitalizing the marshes, either from the central government or local authorities. Rather, after the regime fell, the residents of those areas broke the water barriers, and water returned to the marshes, as you can see in the image. The medium-sized marshes began to reform, and gradually, the local residents returned.

A city like Jabayish had a population of 63,000 people before it was submerged in 1990, most of whom relied on the water economy—such as buffalo breeding, fishing, cutting grass and reeds, making huts, and other goods sourced from these marshes and wetlands. However, by 2005, only 6,000 people remained there. Today, we can say that the area has regained its identity, with the population reaching 61,000 people.

The marshes were reconstructed by local inhabitants when the water level in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers rose. Although the amount of water was not very high, it was sufficient for life in the marshes to revive. This occurred despite the absence of a plan to determine specific areas where life could be revitalized in the marshes.

In December 2003, the Center for Restoration of Iraqi Marshes and Wetlands (CRIMW) was established. In 2005, the center developed a plan to revitalize 5,600 square kilometers of the marshes, which were divided among three main marshes: the Hammar Marsh in the west, the Central Marshes, and the Hawizeh Marsh, which we share with our neighboring country, Iran.

From another perspective, if we look at the hydrological system and water distribution in these marshes from 2003 to 2025, we see that we have not fully achieved our goal except in 2019, when the water level increased to more than 65 billion cubic meters in our three main dams: Mosul Dam, Haditha Dam, and Dukan Dam, along with Lake Sarsar. With this, the rate of marsh restoration reached 97%. However, after that, the rate has fluctuated between 80% and 70%.

After the revival, we faced drought problems. In the 1990s, there was a policy of desiccation. Drought struck us in 2009, again in 2015, and in 2018, but each time drought recurred, a wetter year followed, allowing us to revive the marshes.

In fact, the most severe drought we’ve experienced was the one at the end of 2020, which continues until today. This drought, which persists until 2025, has been devastating. Due to this drought, we’ve lost about 30% of our buffalo herds. Additionally, more than 95% of fish resources and a significant portion of the biodiversity in Iraq's marshes have been lost because of drought.

The wetlands were added to the World Heritage List in 2016 due to their rich biodiversity, which includes several plants, animals, and birds that are on the global endangered species list. Among these are the Egyptian Reed Warbler, a bird that migrates to the marshes from South Africa during the summer season, and Maxwell's Wildlife, a species discovered in 1956 with little prior knowledge about it.

Today, we are again losing birds like Maxwell’s Warbler and the Basra Reed Warbler, and many local inhabitants are migrating due to the dangers facing life in the wetlands and marshes. These dangers are manifested in the decrease in clean water and an increase in water salinity. When water salinity reaches more than 6,000 parts per million, buffalo herders cannot remain in the marshes and must constantly relocate.

Of course, this represents a great danger that we must confront. Today, we don't say the marshes have dried up; instead, we say they have slightly improved compared to last year. Let me give you an example of the changes that have occurred in the marshes due to fluctuations in water levels. For instance, in 2019, the water level of the Euphrates at Jabayish, which is the main area for water distribution to both the 'Hammar' Marsh in the west and the Central Marshes, was 194 centimeters. However, on December 12, 2023, the water level at the same point dropped to 28 centimeters, marking the lowest level in the history of the Euphrates. Today, as I come from Jabayish in the marsh area, the water level at that point is 90 centimeters, which is neither high nor sufficient to withstand the coming summer, as we face significant evaporation. The rate of evaporation in the marshes is approximately 2.8 meters annually. This means that we need to release more water into the wetlands.

What I want to emphasize is that when we included the marshes in a comprehensive water management plan in 2005, we established the necessary water requirements for the marshes and determined that they need approximately 5.4 billion cubic meters annually. This is the minimum amount required to preserve half of the specified area. The other half can be supplied by other water sources after treatment or purification, such as treated water from public facilities. The ‘Main Outfall Drain,’ which is a channel designed to transport saline water from north of Baghdad, from ‘Saqlawiya’ all the way to the Gulf, can provide a large amount of water for wetlands and marshes. It is designed to deliver 200 cubic meters per second. Additionally, the 'East Gharraf Drain' and 'East Amara Drain,' among others, can also contribute.

However, for the past twenty years, we have been unable to benefit from clean water, wastewater, and naturally purified saline water for the marshes. As a result, the marshes today face significant pollution. For instance, more than forty sewage stations discharge directly into the Euphrates, the Tigris, or directly into Iraq’s marshes. Pollutants flow directly into the marshes through both major rivers, and until today, we have been unable to implement the "FETA Technology Project" for purifying the water that flows into the marshes.

This type of water purification is the simplest form, called natural purification, which mimics the processes of nature. We take public sewage water and pass it through plants that have been strategically planted with precise calculations. As a result, we obtain suitable water. Egypt’s experience may serve as the best example of purifying wastewater from public facilities. In Lake Manzala, for instance, Egyptians utilize the treated water not only for the marshes but also for growing vegetables.

Sarah Sanbar:
Thank you very much for that. It was a very clear overview of the situation we're facing. Clearly, the water issue is having significant effects in the south. With that, I would like to turn to our second panelist, who is a lawyer and an expert in water issues and mediation. Dr. Shubber, could you walk us through what the future of water availability and scarcity might look like in Iraq? What are some of the implications of increased water scarcity in Iraq, particularly in relation to its neighboring countries, and how might this impact human rights?

Zaki S. Shubber:
Thank you for having me on this distinguished panel. I also want to thank our first panelist, Mr. Al-Asadi, as he has already illustrated many of the points I’m going to address. But I’d like to start with two brief observations about the connection between water and climate change.

First, I want to connect this to the title of today's event. Climate change introduces uncertainty regarding water availability, exacerbating an already complex issue in water resources management. As many of you know, water management is already considered a "wicked problem"—a problem that is very difficult, if not impossible, to solve. Climate change further disrupts this already complicated issue.

My second point is that this disruption is both a challenge and an opportunity to rethink how we use water. It is often in times of crisis that we realize just how dependent we are on water. We use it not just for drinking, but also for food production, energy production, and industrial purposes. The mobile phones you all have require water for their production. The clothes we wear—everything we use—necessitates water in some way. Our current challenge is that we don’t always have enough water to satisfy all of those needs. Water is already consumed at such a high rate to produce these things, and competition for water is increasing at all levels—from communal to national to international.

Now, if we turn to the effects of climate change here in Iraq, I would like to highlight two key factors. The first is the unpredictability of water availability, which I touched on earlier. Climate change no longer allows us to model or forecast how much water will be available. We now experience erratic precipitation patterns—rainfall comes at different times, in varying quantities, and in different places. The same applies to snowfall. We also face rising temperatures, which are affecting the region—and indeed, the entire globe. We read daily reports about glaciers melting in Asia, Europe, and beyond.

Together, these two factors have three major effects:

1. They decrease river discharge, resulting in less water being available in rivers like the Tigris and Euphrates.
2. They lead to extreme weather events, such as prolonged droughts, heavy rainfall, or storms.
3. Finally, they contribute to sea-level rise, which affects the southern part of the country, increasing salinity in water and damaging land quality.

When we examine these three effects, we can see how they impact water availability. A resource that is already scarce becomes even scarcer. Less water becomes accessible for the various users I’ve already mentioned. This not only affects water for domestic use but also water for agriculture. As we know, agriculture consumes about 70% of all water worldwide, and in Iraq, this percentage is even higher. When less water is available—whether due to decreased rainfall, which affects the northern provinces that rely on rainfall, or in areas that depend on irrigation—this significantly impacts livelihoods. It affects food production and food security. And, of course, it has a profound impact on the environment. We often forget that the environment is also one of the major users of water. As Mr. Jasim has already pointed out, climate change is affecting the marshes, leading to environmental degradation. We are also seeing biodiversity being impacted. This is, ultimately, a human rights issue as well, as it affects the right to a healthy environment.

What are the implications of these effects?

Firstly, when it comes to water resource management—already a complicated issue—it becomes even more complex. Planning becomes increasingly difficult because we are no longer certain how much water will be available. We plan for a certain amount of water, but we can no longer be sure it will be there. As conditions change, there may be a need to adjust plans, which impacts both domestic and international relations.

Water flowing from one country to another, such as with the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, involves multiple states—Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. These effects cross borders, and in the absence of coordinated efforts, questions arise about how to address the situation in each country.

When there is less water available, we are forced to prioritize who gets access to it. Drinking water, of course, is the top priority. As we've already heard, there is a human right to water, and that must come first. But after that, how do we allocate water for the marshes, for agriculture, and for other essential yet less visible purposes? These are difficult and sensitive questions.

In the case of a prolonged drought, for instance, how do we support those who have lost their livelihoods because they no longer have access to water? What alternatives can we offer? These are complex questions, and while I don’t have all the answers, they are essential to ask.

To conclude, I want to highlight two challenges—but also an opportunity.

The uncertainty I’ve mentioned is a major challenge, due to both its impact on water availability and the international dimensions of the issue. This situation is affecting countries across the region, including the riparian states of the Tigris and Euphrates, and also other countries facing similar water-related challenges globally.

For example, Switzerland and France are currently negotiating over the use of the Rhône River, as there is no agreement in place on how much water France should receive from Switzerland for agricultural use and for operating nuclear power plants downstream from Lake Geneva.

Despite these challenges, I believe there is also an opportunity—an opportunity to rethink how we use water, individually, as communities, nationally, and even internationally. The unpredictability of water availability—which we cannot control—will affect us all in different ways. This is a moment for collective action.

Finally, I want to mention something I explained to someone just yesterday. When we talk about water, everyone agrees on how important it is—how we need to value and respect it. But when it comes to taking real action, it often becomes more complicated. When it comes to investing in projects that address water issues, including the challenges of uncertainty and related factors, it becomes harder.

Water is just one of many factors, and uncertainty also affects demand—not just supply. But we can’t just keep talking about it; we need to act. We need to move beyond words and put in the financing and effort required to address these challenges.

Thank you.

Sarah Sanbar:
Thank you. I think you’ve raised some very interesting issues and concerns, and I look forward to hearing from Dr. Al-Mufti shortly about how the government is approaching these challenges. But before we turn to you, Dr. Al-Mufti, I’d like to ask our panelists—especially Ms. Sherri Kraham Talabany. So far, we’ve had a valuable overview of some of the issues and how they’re impacting people. However, we also know that climate change is already, and is expected to continue, disproportionately affecting certain groups—particularly those in society who are already among the most vulnerable, such as women and girls.

Could you speak to some of the specific effects that climate change is having on women and girls in Iraq, and how they are feeling and experiencing these impacts?

Sherri Kraham Talabany:
As you mentioned, we’re already seeing profound and very specific impacts on women and girls, as climate change is both worsening existing inequalities and creating new challenges. These vulnerabilities and impacts intersect and compound one another. Let me highlight five of the most prominent ways in which climate change is affecting women and girls:

First, women and girls face a significantly higher risk of harm during disasters. Statistically, they are 14 times more likely to be harmed in environmental disasters. At least 60% of deaths in climate-related extreme events are women. In countries like Iraq, women and girls already have limited capacity to cope with such crises. They have less access to critical resources, receive insufficient information, and often lack early warnings. As a result, their ability to respond effectively is heavily compromised.

Second, women and girls are more vulnerable to displacement and experience greater challenges when displaced. Environmental degradation—such as rising temperatures and water scarcity—has already contributed to displacement in areas like southern Iraq, as Mr. Jasim Al-Asadi mentioned. Displaced populations are disproportionately affected by storms, floods, and droughts. Within these displaced communities, women and girls face heightened risks, including reduced access to income and a greater exposure to violence.

Third, climate-related events and displacement have been directly linked to a rise in gender-based violence. Stressors triggered by climate change—especially economic ones like displacement and water scarcity—have led to increased violence against women and girls. In some contexts, including Iraq, families have resorted to harmful coping mechanisms such as early or forced marriage in an attempt to alleviate economic pressures that are intensified by climate change.

Fourth, there are major barriers to accessing sexual and reproductive health services. Climate-related events disrupt healthcare infrastructure for everyone, but this disruption disproportionately limits access for women and girls. The consequences include increased maternal and infant mortality, unintended pregnancies, and untreated reproductive health issues.

Finally, climate change exacerbates economic inequalities. We’ve already heard how it affects agriculture and water scarcity—sectors on which many women rely—leading to greater economic hardship. Financial strain further limits access to education, healthcare, and other essential services. In Iraq, for example, only 5 out of 10 women complete secondary education. These challenges are compounded by existing social and economic inequities, resulting in women having fewer assets to cope with the negative impacts of climate change.

Let me close by sharing the story of our client, Fadia. Fadia is a Yazidi woman from Sinjar. She was with a group of women from her family doing household chores when ISIS arrived. Her husband was with the men in the family and had the car, allowing them to escape to Kurdistan. The women, however, were captured. Fadia was subjected to brutal sexual violence and other forms of torture.

Years later, after being rescued, Fadia returned to her family in a displacement camp for Yazidi survivors in the Kurdistan Region. She struggled to provide for her children due to limited access to water, food, livelihoods, and no opportunity to finish her education. Fadia had no influence over family decisions and frequently argued with her husband about leaving the camp and returning to Sinjar. In the camp, she endured repeated floods and fires. Her daughter suffered from waterborne diseases due to contaminated water inside their tent. This remains Fadia’s reality today: living in a displacement camp in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, facing ongoing challenges including lack of access to healthcare, job opportunities, and meaningful control over her future or the ability to mitigate the effects of her displacement.

What we see in Iraq—much like in other regions affected by climate change—is that women and girls, particularly in rural and conflict-affected areas, bear the brunt of these impacts. They face food insecurity, water scarcity, displacement, violence, and a lack of access to critical services and protection.

Sarah Sanbar:
Thank you, Sherri, for sharing that human story with us. It’s really important to remember, especially in forums like this, where we often discuss matters at a high level. These are real, lived experiences that have very tangible impacts on people's lives.

Of course, as the Co-Founder and President of SEED, you're no stranger to the challenges of working in the NGO world. As we both know, changes in funding—particularly the reduction in USAID and other countries scaling back their foreign assistance budgets—mean that resources for these activities are rapidly shrinking.

Do you have any recommendations or advice for policymakers or organizations looking to implement climate programming in a way that ensures the specific needs of women and girls are taken into account?

Sherri Kraham Talabany:
Sure, of course. Thank you. I believe that women need to be present in places where decisions are made, because they are significantly impacted by climate-related disasters. Women are often best positioned to represent the needs of families and communities.

We know that when women participate in policymaking or decision-making—whether at home, in parliament, or within government—the outcomes are better for all of society, not just for women and girls.

It’s especially important in these resource-constrained times, when governments are pulling back, to continue focusing on how to empower women and ensure they have the capacity to contribute to decision-making and policy formulation. Women's voices must be part of the process, and we need to actively consult women about these impacts and how to mitigate them.

We can also support local mechanisms. Here in the Kurdistan Region, we have the Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Sector Coordination Group, which SEED co-leads in partnership with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA). This group coordinates the efforts of around 80 organizations and government agencies, all focused on the protection of women and girls. These are the types of mechanisms that need to be fostered and supported, so we can continue ensuring that the needs of women and girls are addressed here in Kurdistan.

I believe it is critically important—especially as international donors withdraw—that we collectively prioritize support for local mechanisms, decision-making processes, services, and coordination led by local actors. There has never been a more important time to invest in Kurdistan’s long-term capacity to manage climate-related impacts.

Sarah:
Thank you. I think you’re absolutely right, and your comments provide a perfect segue to Dr. Torhan Al-Mufti, who serves as the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Water Affairs. He brings a wealth of expertise both to us today and to the Iraqi government.

Dr. Torhan, could you walk us through some of the steps the government has been taking to address water-related challenges, since that is your area of expertise? I would also appreciate your insights on the broader climate-related issues.

In light of Sherri’s intervention, I’d particularly like to hear about any efforts by the government to ensure that the needs of women and girls are considered and integrated into this programming.

Dr. Torhan Al-Mufti:
Thank you. Before I speak about what we are doing to address the water situation, I would like to respond to a few points raised by my colleague.

Iraq’s water budget, in a good season, requires about 90 billion cubic meters of water. In years of drought or poor rainfall, this figure drops to approximately 50 billion cubic meters. Historically, Iraq has remained within this range year after year.

However, what we are experiencing now cannot be separated from the regional and global impacts of climate change. We are already seeing clear changes in rainfall patterns. For example, about 15 years ago, we typically saw one year of strong rainfall followed by a year of poor rainfall. Today, that pattern has shifted—we now experience one year of good rainfall followed by two, three, or even four consecutive years of poor rainfall or near-drought conditions. This year, for instance, we had one year of favorable rainfall followed by four years of inadequate rainfall.

This trend shows that while we may not yet be in a full drought, we are very close—only one step away from entering an official drought period.

Another critical point is that 75% of Iraq’s water supply originates from neighboring countries. Only 20–25% of our water is sourced domestically, primarily from surface water—not underground reserves.

The main challenge we face is the absence of a formal, binding agreement with our neighboring countries on water rights. While there are some memorandums of understanding (MOUs), there are no fixed or enforceable agreements. Our upstream neighbors do not officially recognize Iraq’s rights as a riparian (downstream) country. This allows them to divert or use water resources without consulting Iraq or disclosing the quantities involved.

Although this issue has existed for centuries, formal negotiations and discussions with our neighbors have only gained momentum over the past eight years.

Looking back 70 years, Iraq's population was predominantly rural, with only 30% residing in cities and the remaining 70% in villages. However, according to the most recent national census, this distribution has reversed: 70% of the population now lives in urban areas, particularly in major cities. This demographic shift presents significant challenges for the government, particularly in addressing social conflict and the growing demand for job opportunities and public services in urban settings.

In light of the absence of a clear water-sharing agreement with neighboring countries, Iraq has begun to explore alternative solutions. Notably, we signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Turkey, which provides approximately 70% of Iraq’s water supply. This MoU covers both water resources and economic cooperation, and it has already yielded positive results. For example, in 2024, the volume of water received from the Tigris River doubled compared to 2023. We are also exploring the possibility of a similar agreement with Iran, which supplies around 13% of Iraq's water. The success of the Turkish MoU gives us hope for further progress on that front.

Regarding Iraq’s marshes, they represent about 10–15% of the country's surface water reserves. Additionally, Iraq faces significant water loss due to evaporation—an estimated 6 to 8 billion cubic meters annually. This is a major concern, especially as Iraq is ranked among the 15 countries most affected by climate change. To address these issues, we are encouraging farmers to adopt modern agricultural technologies, even for water-intensive crops such as rice. Furthermore, we are constructing small dams—referred to as “water hunts”—in desert and remote areas to preserve water.

Despite these efforts, Iraq continues to face major water management challenges. The most crucial step moving forward is fostering a culture of water conservation. This issue is not unique to Iraq; climate change is impacting the entire globe. We must raise public awareness and educate citizens on the value of water and the importance of conserving it for future generations.

Finally, my colleague mentioned the treatment and re-treatment of agricultural wastewater—particularly leachate water—which accounts for 10–15% of Iraq’s water usage. While this water can be treated to improve quality, it does not increase the overall water volume. It improves the usability of the water but does not contribute to the total available supply. Thank you.

Sarah:
Thank you. We have a few minutes left, so I'd just like to reiterate my question: Is there anything you’re particularly proud of regarding the government's actions? And are there any ways the government is addressing the specific needs of women and girls when designing water policies?

Dr. Torhan Al-Mufti:
As I mentioned earlier, one of the significant achievements is the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey, which includes provisions on water supply and economic cooperation. It’s progressing well. If we compare the current status of our dams to last year, the improvement is substantial—about double. While this is still not enough, it does represent meaningful progress. Additionally, we have begun encouraging farmers to adopt new agricultural technologies. I want to emphasize once again the importance of creating a culture in which people recognize the value of water in each season and understand the necessity of proper water management.

Sarah:
Thank you so much. With that, we are just about out of time. I hope you will all join me in thanking our expert panelists, and I hope you learned something—I certainly did. Thank you very much.