Robin Mills:
Thank you, and good morning. Welcome to the third day of the conference. I’m very pleased to begin today with a panel on energy, a crucial topic. We’ve heard a lot about it over the past couple of days, but now we’ll have the opportunity to delve deeper into the subject of energy, including oil, gas, electricity, and their significance for the Kurdistan Region, Iraq as a whole, and the broader regional landscape.

I’m honored to have such an excellent and distinguished panel to discuss this topic. You’ve already heard their introductions, but as a reminder, we have Dr. Luay al-Khateeb, former Minister of Electricity and member of the Federal Energy Council; Dr. Izzat Sabir, Deputy Minister of Oil for Gas Affairs; and Mr. Matthew Zais, Vice President for Government Affairs at HKN Energy and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Energy.
We were also expecting to be joined by Dunya Chalabi from Total Energies, but unfortunately, we’re experiencing some technical difficulties in connecting with her online, so please excuse us for that.

The energy sector in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region has undergone significant changes and challenges over the past few years, but there has also been progress. Recently, there has been optimism surrounding the resumption of oil exports from the Kurdistan Region through Turkey, the increase in Iraq’s natural gas production, and the broader development of the energy sector, including refining, renewable energy, and other areas.
Of course, new challenges lie ahead. Political developments in the region continue to impact the oil and gas sector. I’d like to explore some of these issues with my panel, and I’d like to start with you, Dr. Luay. Could you share your thoughts on the upcoming elections and their potential impact on energy cooperation between the federal authorities and the Kurdistan Region?

Dr. Luay al-Khateeb:
Thank you very much, Robin, and good morning to everyone. The key question is whether the future government—or rather, the political parties—will be more realistic and sincere in their efforts to move forward in developing constitutional institutions, rather than relying on political deals. Typically, once such deals are reached, there is little to no commitment to them.
We have seen numerous political agreements reached by various parties, whether during federal budget negotiations or the formation of new governments. However, once these agreements are finalized, there is often no compliance. The only solution is to focus on developing federal laws and the relevant federal institutions in accordance with the constitution so that all parties are bound by them, rather than relying on annual federal budget agreements or government formations every four years.

The Hydrocarbon Law, the Revenue-Sharing Law, and the establishment of relevant federal institutions are more necessary than ever to regulate these relationships and safeguard Iraq’s federal system. As mentioned on the first day of the conference, our constitution is federal in text, but in practice, the system remains centralized. One of the main challenges is that Baghdad interprets federalism through the lens of centralism, while the Kurdistan Regional Government views it through the lens of confederalism. Neither side is approaching the issue as defined by the constitution itself.

What we need is a federal framework with federal laws and institutions that align with the federal constitution. Without these, it will be difficult to trust that any political agreement will endure beyond the formation of a new government. I emphasize this point at every opportunity because, unfortunately, the lack of trust between parties has only grown since 2005.

Robin Mills:
Thank you, Dr. Luay. Dr. Izzat, I appreciate you joining us. Please feel free to respond in Arabic or English, whichever language you prefer.
The gas industry in Iraq has made progress in recent years, but there are still significant challenges. There are ongoing issues with the delivery of Iranian gas, as well as challenges in capturing and utilizing flared gas, with the goal of eventually eliminating flaring altogether. Could you elaborate on the plans for the gas sector and where you see its development over the next few years?

Dr. Izzat Sabir:
Thank you very much, Mr. Robin, and thank you to Rudaw. I am the Deputy Minister of Oil in Iraq, but since I am in Erbil, I would like to speak in Kurdish. I have prepared a presentation, and I would like our discussion to be based on numbers. I will try to answer your question briefly.
The government of Mr. Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani has named his cabinet the "Service Cabinet" and has placed great importance on the oil and gas sector in Iraq. At the beginning of this new cabinet's tenure, 47% of all gas in Iraq was being flared. Now, as we approach 2025, we have reduced this to 14% of the gas being flared, which has been invested. Every one percent of flared gas equates to $1 billion lost when burned. However, if invested, it could generate $3 billion in revenue.

The Iraqi government has decided to invest $10 billion in the gas sector from 2020 to 2030, with the expectation of receiving $30 billion in return. Several gas projects are currently underway, and some have already been completed in previous years. We also have plans for future projects. One of the other guests, Dunia Chalabi, who represents the French company Total in Iraq, was supposed to join us. Total Energy, along with Qatar Energy and the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, is investing $25 billion in the oil and gas sector, electricity, and water purification for oil fields. For example, over the next four years, they will invest in 600 million cubic feet of gas in Iraq.

The Ministry of Oil’s plan is to eliminate gas flaring by 2030. Unfortunately, Iraq is one of the top three countries in the world for flaring associated gas, wasting this valuable resource. At the same time, Iraq imports gas from Iran. Many people say, "You are burning your own gas and importing gas from Iran!" This is true, and there is some truth to this statement. However, we are working hard to address this issue, and the Ministry of Oil has not been idle. As I mentioned, 14% of the gas that was being flared has been invested over the past three years, reducing the losses. Additionally, by the end of 2025, 75% of Iraq's gas will be invested.

Iraq signed the Paris Agreement in 2015 and is committed to eliminating all gas flaring by 2030. This will not only create a cleaner environment but also generate significant revenue, wealth, and resources for Iraq. Iraq has 127 trillion cubic feet of gas, which, if invested, would be sufficient to meet Iraq's needs for the next 100 years.

Iraq has also prepared for the possibility that, due to future sanctions imposed on Iran, it may not be able to continue importing gas from Iran as it has in the past. To address this, Iraq has signed an agreement with Turkmenistan for gas, though it must come through Iran. Unfortunately, this agreement has not yet been properly implemented. While the contract has been signed, it has not entered the implementation phase because Iraq does not share a border with Turkmenistan. Therefore, Turkmenistan would need to provide the gas to Iran, and Iran would then deliver it to Iraq through Basra. Additionally, we have explored other alternatives, and serious efforts have been made over the past four to five months. One method, known as FSTU (Floating Storage Tank Unit), would allow Iraq to import gas from Qatar, Algeria, or any other country.
I want to emphasize that we are not only relying on external sources to supply us with gas. Internally, there is no gas field in Iraq that does not have a contract with an international company. However, gas processes are different from oil and require more time, are more complex, and involve different technologies.

Now that the slides are ready, I would like to present some key figures to better understand the current situation of the gas sector in Iraq, which is closely linked to the Kurdistan Region. Recently, the Prime Minister of Iraq decided to provide more liquefied gas to the Kurdistan Region to meet household needs. It is crucial that the relationship between Iraq and the Kurdistan Region in the gas sector remains continuous and complementary. Both Iraq and the Kurdistan Region should mutually benefit from this relationship, based on contracts and mutual advantages for all parties involved.

The Iraqi government has conducted two rounds of contracts, Round 5+1 and Round 6. Through these contracts, 20 oil fields have been awarded to global companies, including both local and Chinese companies.
In terms of numbers, Iraq's plan for 2030 is to eliminate gas flaring. Iraq's gas reserves total 127 trillion cubic feet, and the country produces 1,140 billion cubic feet of gas annually. These reserves are enough to last for another 111 years. In terms of gas reserves, Iraq ranks 11th globally and 5th among Arab countries. Of Iraq's gas production, 75% is associated gas, which is produced alongside oil and is flared because it has not been invested in. The remaining 25% is "free gas," located in areas such as Kirkuk, Khormor, Chamchamal, and several other regions.
From an investment perspective, in 2021, 53% of Iraq's gas production was invested, meaning 47% was flared. By 2024, 66% of the gas was invested, leaving 34% flared. Additionally, approximately 1,683 million cubic feet of gas have been invested in for use in electricity production stations.

The projects set to be implemented over the next two years will bring gas production to 1,100 million cubic feet, which will help improve the electricity situation and provide more gas products in Iraq. By 2036, Iraq aims to reach a production level of 6 to 7 billion cubic feet of gas. One of the major projects contributing to this goal is the Artawi gas project in Basra, being implemented by TotalEnergies, Qatar Energy, and the Ministry of Oil.
Currently, Iraq's gas sector produces 2,143 million cubic feet of gas, and the total planned production until 2036 is 3,990 million cubic feet. By 2030, Iraq's gas production is expected to reach 6,133 million cubic feet.

Iraq also produces Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), with a daily production of 9,115 tons. This is an increase from 6,676 tons per day in 2024. In terms of exports, Iraq exported 456,944 tons of liquefied natural gas in 2024. This is a significant increase from 136,990 tons in 2021.
In conclusion, I would like to briefly point out that Iraq has the capacity to produce 5.5 million barrels of oil per day. However, due to OPEC limitations or quotas, Iraq is currently producing 4.5 million barrels per day. Of this, approximately 1 million barrels are used domestically, and about 3.5 million barrels are exported daily, which amounts to 100 million barrels of oil exported per month. Additionally, Iraq’s Plan B in response to the OPEC limit is to increase the number of refineries and the refining capacity to meet its own oil product needs, reducing the import of oil products. Moreover, other petrochemical projects are planned to produce various products from refineries, so Iraq will not only export crude oil but also export value-added products derived from crude oil.

Robin:
Okay, Dr. [Luay al-Khateeb], thank you. That was extremely informative regarding the gas sector and the progress made. I believe we will return to discuss gas further during the panel. But now, I’d like to turn to my third guest, Mr. Matthew Zais.
Matthew, we hear a lot about the political agreement that has been made regarding the resumption of oil exports through the pipeline to Turkey. Can you share your perspective on this and what you think needs to be in place for international oil companies operating in Kurdistan to resume exports? What more still needs to be done?

Matthew Zais:
Thanks, Robin. It’s an honor to be here at the Rudaw Conference and to be joined by Dr. Luay. Both of us knew each other when we were in government, and we’ve discussed many of these topics before. It’s also an honor to be here with Dr. Izzat.
Regarding the reopening of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline, there has been significant media coverage about the political agreements reached to resume exports. Next month will mark the two-year anniversary of the pipeline closure, which has highlighted the substantial lose-lose situation for Iraq. The Iraqi people are losing significant revenue from the Kurdistan Region, and the investment climate, along with oil companies, is similarly affected. Ideally, these political agreements should lead to a win-win outcome because both the Iraqi people and the investment environment are at stake.

However, I want to highlight that the perception among international oil companies—particularly at HKN Energy, the largest private investor in Iraq and the largest investor in the Kurdistan Region—is that there is confusion surrounding these political agreements. Specifically, there is a lack of clarity regarding the distinction between the legislative framework and political agreements. While these agreements are necessary, they are not sufficient for exports to resume.

For exports to restart, not only are political and legislative agreements required, but also commercial agreements, which have not yet been finalized. Perhaps the audience saw yesterday’s news, which took us all by surprise. We learned that on Tuesday, the Iraq Oil Ministry filed a new legal claim against our contracts in Baghdad. This occurred on the same day that Prime Minister al-Sudani had a call with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, during which the reopening of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline was the first topic raised. This demonstrates the ongoing political divisions in Baghdad and the desire to reopen the pipeline, particularly by securing the necessary commercial agreements.

That legal filing also highlights one of the two critical commercial agreements that must be addressed. These agreements pertain to payment assurance and contract sanctity. Regarding payment assurance, there is a misconception that the budget law itself is sufficient from a commercial perspective. However, just like any company operating in federal Iraq, we require not only a political and legislative framework that enables us to produce and export oil but also essential commercial agreements. These include lifting agreements, which govern the transfer of production and payments made by state agencies, particularly SOMO, for exports.
As for contract sanctity, the legislation explicitly states the role of a technical consultant. From the perspective of international oil companies, the outstanding commercial agreement concerns defining the scope of work and plan for this consultant. It is essential to ensure that the consultant’s work does not negatively impact our contractual terms, which have been upheld as legal and valid in Iraqi courts and remain legally valid under international law. Reaching this agreement is critical.

We are encouraged by the legislative and political agreements that have been reached and remain hopeful that Iraqi oil exports will resume through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline. This is essential for multiple reasons, including Iraq’s need for redundant export routes—not only through the Gulf but also through the Mediterranean. However, the commercial agreements are equally necessary, and international oil companies are ready to finalize them as soon as possible so that exports can resume.

Robin:
Thank you, Matt. You mentioned the call between Secretary of State Rubio and Prime Minister al-Sudani. Dr. Luay, what do you think the impact of the Trump administration will be on Iraq’s energy relations, both internal and external?

Dr. Luay:
Well, during President Trump's first term, back in 2018 and 2019, when I was serving as Minister of Electricity, the U.S. administration was very focused on ending Iraq’s reliance on electricity and gas imports from Iran. This was primarily due to the sanctions imposed on Iran and concerns over financial transactions involving sanctioned countries.
At that time, we entered negotiations to persuade them that we needed a reasonable transition period to develop our own energy assets and establish new supply agreements. This included interconnectivity with neighboring countries and sourcing gas and electricity from competitive suppliers worldwide. However, the exemptions for importing energy from Iran were gradually reduced—from three months to just one month.

Now, with pressure mounting daily, the U.S. potentially enforcing a complete halt on Iranian energy imports could pose serious risks to Iraq’s economy and political stability. As of now, there are no explicit executive orders or formal texts enforcing this, but we can foresee the possibility emerging in the coming weeks or months. If that happens, Iraq’s position—especially during the summer—will be compromised, as gas supplies account for 40-50% of the country's power generation.

Alternative solutions, such as importing from Qatar or elsewhere, require time to develop the necessary infrastructure. Additionally, importing LNG comes with significantly higher costs compared to pipeline gas. Iranian gas remains the most competitive option, not just for affordability but also due to its impact on electricity supply. Even importing electricity from neighboring countries is limited and would take time to scale up. The GCCIA grid and the Iraq-Saudi interconnection, for example, are still under development and would contribute no more than 0.5% of Iraq’s total demand.

At the core of this issue is not just a technical or logistical challenge—it’s an economic one. Energy security in Iraq is complex, and the general public often assumes that simply building more power plants or expanding infrastructure will solve the problem. But the reality is far more intricate.

For example, since 2003, Iraq’s oil production has tripled, gas production has quadrupled, and electricity output has increased eightfold. However, conflicts like Daesh’s insurgency have destroyed about 25% of this capacity. Despite having sufficient generation capacity for 24/7 electricity, there remains significant inequality in distribution and consumption. The power grid lacks automation, proper billing systems, and smart metering, which are essential to ensure full cost recovery. Power theft, non-compliance with payment regulations, and the failure to enforce billing laws mean that less than 10% of electricity costs are being recovered.

Currently, Iraq sells electricity at nearly one cent per kilowatt-hour, while it costs the government over 12 cents to produce. This is simple economics—when prices are artificially low, demand skyrockets. This explains why the Ministry of Electricity projects demand of 50 or 60 gigawatts when, realistically, Iraq may only need 30 gigawatts. However, even 30 gigawatts will remain unsustainable unless electricity pricing is reformed.

But tariff reform is not just about raising prices—it requires a broader economic restructuring. This includes reforming the tax system, redefining contract types, and restructuring the energy sector. Public companies need to be separated from ministries, with the government acting as a regulator and policymaker rather than an operator. Power generation and distribution should be managed by the private sector.

This is not an issue that can be solved by one person—it’s a commitment that demands support from all stakeholders, including the government, legislative bodies, and the public. Without collective action, achieving a sustainable national grid and ensuring energy security will be impossible.

The power sector’s problems didn’t start in 2003—they date back to 1991. The difference is that, between 1991 and 2003, Iraq functioned under a dictatorship that controlled electricity consumption. Since 2003, Iraq has been transitioning toward democracy, but without the necessary institutional and economic reforms, managing the energy sector remains a challenge.

Robin: Thank you, Dr. al-Khateeb. Given the difficulties in the gas sector, Dr. Izzat, could you share your thoughts on the short-term challenges in the gas industry and how to meet the growing demand for both gas and electricity?

Ezzat Sabir:
Actually, I would like to comment on the minister's words. He mentioned many problems, but I expected him to offer a solution. It is true that the price of electricity is nearly free, which leads to citizens using it inefficiently and excessively. However, we need to find a solution.
In some areas of Baghdad, the private sector has been given responsibility for collecting payments. I live in one of these areas. Every first week of the month, they come and tell us that if we do not pay, they will cut off the electricity. The price they charge is also quite high.
A very good example has been set in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. One of the solutions to Iraq's electricity problem is the installation of smart meters, if they are affordable. These meters allow citizens to use electricity more efficiently.

I also support the Minister’s statement that the electricity problem cannot be solved merely by increasing gas production and adding more power plants. Demand must be reduced, rather than simply increasing supply and constructing new power plants.
We also face problems with power plants. For instance, there is a 2,000 MW power plant in Mansouriah that was supposed to be supplied with gas for investment. However, the gas production project failed, and we were unable to produce gas, leaving the plant non-operational. By the end of this year, a power plant in Anbar will be completed and connected to the Okaaz gas field. However, the Okaaz gas field will not be ready for gas production for another two years.

As the Minister is sitting here, Iraq’s electricity demand has reached a peak of 50,000 MW, but Iraq’s electricity production stands at just 25,000 MW. Bridging this gap is not easy. There is no country in the world that relies solely on gas or crude oil to generate electricity. Therefore, Iraq must use and diversify its other resources for electricity generation.
Regarding the relations between Erbil and Baghdad, I believe that the better the relations between Erbil and Baghdad, the better it will be for the citizens. For example, Iraq sends 50 million liters of kerosene to the Kurdistan Region annually. Additionally, between 20,000 and 30,000 tons of liquefied natural gas have been sent to citizens in recent times.

Above all, the markets of both parties and governments must cooperate. Iraq is a market for the Kurdistan Region, and vice versa, particularly for energy transfer and mutual needs. There has been an intense discussion recently about why, if Iraq needs gas, the Kurdistan Region cannot supply it?
Eventually, an agreement was reached that it is in the interest of the Kurdistan Region to provide electricity to Iraq instead of gas, as it will yield better financial returns, which is their right. I hope that the relationship between Erbil and Baghdad will continue to improve, particularly in the energy sector. As a Kurdish representative in the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, my duty is to advocate for the rights and interests of all Iraqi people, including those in the Kurdistan Region.

The Minister mentioned that investing in gas is a long-term and complex process. To generate 50,000 megawatts of electricity, you would need 10 billion cubic feet of gas per day. However, Iraq's gas production, including imports from Iran, is currently less than 3 billion cubic feet per day. All power plants require 10 billion cubic feet of gas daily. While Iraq has significant gas reserves, we may not reach the required production levels even by 2035. If you ask me when Iraq will be able to provide an alternative to Iranian gas, on average, about 800 million cubic feet of gas have been imported from Iran over the past five years. At the same time, Iraq's gas production has increased by 600 million cubic feet in the last five months. This means that in about a year, we will replace the Iranian gas imports. However, this will not be enough to meet the total demand for power plants across Iraq.

Around ten years ago, 20% of Iraq's electricity was produced from gas, while the rest came from crude oil and diesel. Today, 40% to 45% of Iraq's electricity is generated from gas. This means that the more gas we produce for power plants, the less costly the electricity becomes, as gas is much cheaper than gasoline or crude oil. One million cubic feet of gas is equivalent to 200 barrels of crude oil. Therefore, it is my hope and our duty to ensure that the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad have strong relations. I will not hesitate to provide for the energy needs of the Kurdistan Region, whether in the Ministry of Oil or through Baghdad, and vice versa.

Regarding the export of oil from the Kurdistan Region, we have a type of oil in Kirkuk that is often traded at $2 above the price of Brent crude, which means that Kirkuk oil is of better quality than Brent oil. Certainly, if the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad agree to export the oil from the Kurdistan Region and sell it at a very competitive price, it would generate significant revenue for all Iraqis, including those in the Kurdistan Region.

Robin:
Thank you, Doctor. Matt, the Prime Minister mentioned in his speech at the opening of this conference that he looks forward to increased cooperation with international oil companies (IOCs) in Kurdistan. He also noted that this agreement could open a new chapter for them. What opportunities do you think this agreement presents for IOCs in Kurdistan, and what needs to happen to ensure its success?

Matthew:
Yes, I think we all heard his comments and welcomed them, as we need to turn the page and start a new chapter—one in which international investors can succeed across all of Iraq, including the Kurdistan region.
First, as I mentioned earlier, the priority is to reach the necessary commercial agreements that will allow exports to resume. This is directly related to our discussion on gas. The investment environment in the Kurdistan region has been significantly impacted by the closure of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) for almost two years. This has had a ripple effect on all energy production and investment decisions, not just in Kurdistan but across Iraq.
For example, two years ago, the region produced approximately 417,000 barrels of oil per day. However, when discussions resumed about exporting oil and reopening the ITP, many were surprised to learn that production in the Kurdistan region had dropped to as low as 300,000 barrels per day. This decline is a direct reflection of the lack of a viable investment environment. International oil companies have been struggling to maintain existing production while selling at significant discounts in the local market. This situation does not allow companies to make meaningful investments to sustain or increase production, which is why we have seen such a steep decline in output over the last two years.

If the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline reopens following the necessary commercial agreements, it will restore confidence among international oil companies and create an environment where investment can resume. This would enable a return to previous investment cycles, bringing production levels back to where they were—and hopefully beyond.
The reopening of the ITP also has broader implications, particularly for the gas sector. The lack of an investor-friendly environment due to the pipeline's closure has prevented any significant investment in gas. The reopening of the ITP would not only enable the resumption of oil exports—both from the Kurdistan region and from Federal Iraq, as Dr. Izzat mentioned—but it would also create an investment climate where Kurdistan’s gas resources can be properly developed. As has been discussed here, these resources are crucial for all of Iraq. There are significant gas reserves in the Kurdistan region, including non-associated gas, that must be developed to meet the country’s energy demands and production goals.

In short, reopening the ITP would send a strong signal to the international community that Iraq is once again an investor-friendly destination. This is essential for meeting Iraq’s future energy needs.

Robin:
Thank you. I think we now have some time for questions from the audience. Let’s begin with the gentleman in the front row.

Question 1: You talked extensively about investing in energy, but you did not address the natural environment. Specifically, you have only mentioned the economic environment. My question is about the Hawayza Marsh. In 2016, the Hawayza Marsh was designated a World Heritage Site, among four sites in the Iraqi Wetlands. Today, there is significant oil activity in the Hawayza Marsh. What has the Iraqi Ministry of Oil done, or is doing, to address the pollution of the Hawayza Marsh due to oil activities, and to reduce the risks to the hydrological system in this area? There is now a new experimental oil field in the Hawayza Marsh area. In short, what can be done to reduce environmental pollution in the Hawayza Marsh?

Question 2: Sir, when we discuss government failure in the power sector, you always suggest magic solutions. I have heard both of you mention the private sector’s role. My question is: Why does the private sector succeed and make profits, but the public sector fails and loses, especially in a profitable sector like electricity?

Dr. Izzat Sabir:
There have been environmental disasters in two parts of Iraq: one in Kirkuk and the other in Basra. The situation in Kirkuk was caused by the drilling of oil wells, which polluted a large area. In fact, there is a committee in the Ministry of Oil that we are overseeing to find ways to protect the environment. We are closely monitoring the situation and working on solutions to address the environmental disaster. Examples of environmental projects include Total Energy’s projects, which generate 1,000 megawatts of solar electricity, eliminate the burning of 600 million cubic feet of associated gas, and treat 5 million barrels of Shatt al-Arab water daily for use in oil wells that currently rely on river water. This water is no longer only used in the water treatment project; it can now also be used for agriculture. All these projects will benefit the environment.
Regarding Mr. Rahman’s question on why the private sector makes a profit and the public sector loses, it’s because the government’s goal is not to make a profit, but to serve its people. For example, electricity is considered a public good worldwide, which means it should be accessible to all. The challenge is how to regulate it and set prices that prevent overuse. If electricity is subsidized and people don’t pay the full price, they may misuse it. In countries where electricity is cheap, it tends to be wasted. If it is misused, the government loses money. It’s also worth noting that much of Iraq’s electricity is produced by the private sector, and power plants are privately owned. For example, the Basmaya plant, which generates 5,000 MW of electricity, is privately owned, but the distribution is managed by the Iraqi government. We need to consider how to use this energy efficiently, and one solution is the implementation of smart meters.

Dr. Luay al-Khateeb:
The answer to your question about the success of the private sector compared to the public sector lies in the issue of government support. The transition from socialism to a market economy has not followed global standards. The volume of government subsidies for projects has increased in recent years to more than $33 billion annually, with absolutely no hope of repayment from consumers and beneficiaries.
Support measures and tariffs, such as those on fuel, services, and electricity, create a huge burden on the Iraqi treasury and state revenues, negatively affecting the country's gross domestic product.

Failure to collect this money will lead to the accumulation of debt and increased annual bank interest rates in Iraq. So when you hear that a company is investing, this is not truly an investment but rather the accumulation of debt. True investment involves risk-sharing, cost recovery, and profit from consumers.
The equation must be corrected economically. When there are consumers and commodities, there is no such thing as free services or emotional definitions for the citizen. Electricity is not something that came from the heavens; it is a commodity with high supply and production costs.

In the last 30-40 years, due to the growth of cooling and heating systems worldwide, the cost of the energy sector has increased drastically across the globe. The energy crisis is not just a domestic issue for Iraq, but a global one.
About one billion of the world’s eight billion people lack access to electricity, and around three billion people suffer from energy shortages. So, this is not just an Iraqi issue, but a global concern.

President Trump has made energy and cost-cutting a priority on his agenda. In the United States, which has a population of 340 million, one-third of Americans are now suffering from global price increases. So, this is not solely an issue for Iraq. Europe also faces much higher energy costs than the Middle East. We are among the few countries in the region, such as Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq, that still provide this kind of support. Other Gulf countries, like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have reduced these subsidies, benefiting their sectors. As a result, their energy sectors now bring in around $20 billion annually.