Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
I believe one of our participants is not yet visible—Mr. Mehmet Emin Ekmen. Does anyone know where he is? Should we begin? Perhaps he’ll join us shortly. If that works for everyone, let’s proceed.
Welcome, everyone. My name is Arzu Yılmaz. I am an Associate Professor at the University of Kurdistan – Erbil.
I think we can all agree that yesterday was a truly historic day. There is no doubt that the Kurdish issue has significantly shaped both Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. Accordingly, we can expect—and hope—for some changes in the direction of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy in the near future.
Today, we are fortunate to explore the question of what kind of change can be expected following yesterday’s statement from Abdullah Öcalan.
We are joined by Mr. Oğuz Kaan Salıcı, representing the Republican People’s Party (CHP), who previously served as the party’s deputy chairman.
We are also expecting Mr. Mehmet Emin Ekmen, Deputy Chair of the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA) and a current member of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye.
Mr. Abdurrahman Kurt is with us as well—he is a former member of parliament representing the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
And we have with us Mr. Cengiz Çandar, who is a current member of parliament from the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party).
Ah, and now Mr. Mehmet Emin Ekmen has arrived—welcome!
We often joke about “Kurdish time” in Kurdistan, but it seems “Turkish time” may not be any better, right?
With the consent of the participants, I will now continue in Turkish. Let this be another gesture of goodwill from the Kurds to Turkey. I’d like to begin with Mr. Oğuz Kaan Salıcı, if that is agreeable to everyone.
Yesterday marked a significant moment in the context of Turkey’s 100-year history. Furthermore, the CHP has announced its presidential candidate for the upcoming election. It is widely acknowledged that the CHP’s recent electoral success was strongly supported by Kurdish voters.
My first question, in light of yesterday’s statement, is this:
Will the support from Kurdish voters for the CHP continue—especially as Mr. Ekrem İmamoğlu launched his campaign on the same day?
Can the CHP maintain or even regain this support in the current political environment?
Does the CHP have specific plans and programs aimed at resolving the Kurdish issue?
CHP members often state, “We are preparing a governance project,” and they emphasize that such a project includes a framework for addressing the Kurdish question. Within this context, what preparations has the CHP made in terms of general and individual rights?
Additionally, does the CHP acknowledge any responsibility for the emergence or prolonged unresolved nature of the Kurdish issue over the past 40 years?
If so, how is this perspective incorporated into the governance program the party is developing?
Please go ahead. If you agree, we have allocated 10 minutes for each speaker.

Oğuz Kaan Salıcı:
First, thank you for inviting us. I’m very happy to be in Erbil today. I also want to mention that today marks the tenth anniversary of Yaşar Kemal’s passing. He was a great author—a Kurdish writer who composed all his works in Turkish. Let us remember him here.
If you’d like, I can begin with a few remarks on the traditional position of the Republican People’s Party and then return to your questions. The Republican People’s Party is the main opposition party. It is also a social democratic party, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and thus is the founding party of the Republic of Turkey.
When we discuss the Kurdish issue, we must consider the political lineage of the Republican People’s Party—including its predecessor, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). Due to past military coups in Turkey, many parties were closed and later reestablished under different names, so I felt it necessary to provide this context. Our party is sensitive to the Kurdish issue. It is a political party that recognizes the existence of a Kurdish issue and maintains that it must be resolved through democratic means.
During the most recent resolution process, which took place between 2013 and 2015, the Republican People’s Party emphasized that the issue should be addressed in the Turkish Parliament. At the time, the party was led by Mr. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu responded to then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements, saying: “Even though I know this may harm my political standing, we want to express our trust in this process of yours.” However, the government at the time responded by saying they did not need our trust. They chose to manage the process independently and did not intend to involve the main opposition. There was no meaningful cooperation. The process was not carried out through Parliament, as we had insisted. We all saw the result. A wave of violence followed.
In the most recent local elections, the Republican People’s Party emerged as the leading political party. Today, we hold more than 400 municipalities, including most of the major ones, which are now governed by Republican People’s Party mayors.
However, when it comes to the Kurdish issue, we find that the Republican People’s Party—despite being the main opposition force in Turkish politics—is hindered from taking additional progressive steps. Now, we are simultaneously engaging in discussions regarding yesterday’s announcement: namely, the potential laying down of arms and the dissolution of the PKK. Let me start by saying that this is an extremely important development. Friends, politics cannot function under the shadow of weapons.
Not only is politics incompatible with the presence of weapons, but the era of seeking rights through armed struggle is long over. Reaching this point today, I hope that the PKK will be dissolved, weapons laid down, and a new phase will begin. Following this phase, democratization must occur—not only for the Kurdish population, but for all 85 million residents of Turkey. We must view the opposition’s candidacy for power, and the creation of a political program concerning the Kurdish issue, within this framework.
Let me give you an example. If I’m not mistaken, two weeks ago, a fortune teller in Turkey was arrested because of comments she made on social media regarding certain politicians. A fortune teller was arrested. This illustrates the urgent need for democratization in Turkey.

In addition, some time ago, 10 municipal council members from the Republican People’s Party were arrested. A government-appointed trustee (kayyum) was assigned to the Esenyurt Municipality. The same happened in Ovacık, in the province of Tunceli. Two days ago, I was in Erbil. The Mayor of Beykoz in Istanbul was arrested. The Mayor of Beşiktaş was also arrested. Some of these issues are directly related to the Kurdish issue, while others are not. What’s clear is that the democratic standards in Turkey must be raised. We must work toward a democratic standard that is inclusive of everyone.

Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: Well, can you clarify whether the CHP addresses the Kurdish issue through a specific program and vision that is distinct from the broader democratization of Turkey?

Oğuz Kaan Salıcı: Well…

Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: In fact, the perspective that “if Turkey is democratized, then the Kurdish issue will be resolved” was widely debated in the 1990s. Is that still where you stand?
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı: It’s not just that. Raising the general standards of democratization—bringing them to a higher level—is essential. If we recall Atatürk’s vision of “reaching the level of contemporary civilizations,” this is the kind of Turkey we aspire to. This entails elevating democratic standards across the entire country.
You also mentioned individual and collective rights. We believe that collective rights are not the appropriate approach for any part of Turkey; rather, individual rights must be strengthened. Therefore, we support a system in which all citizens of Turkey, united under shared citizenship, can enjoy freedom of expression within a democratic framework, reflect on peace and democracy, and aspire to a shared life.
We do not see a choice between “either peace or democracy.” We want both peace and democracy. Peace can be achieved through the laying down of arms. If armed terrorism and armed struggle come to an end, then peace can be realized. But is that sufficient? Certainly not—without democracy, it is not enough.
For a democratic transition, for example, we take issue with the current presidential system. As the Republican People’s Party, we advocate for a strengthened parliamentary system. In order to raise democratic standards, the presidential system must be abolished, and we must return to the parliamentary system. That change to a presidential system was made in 2017, and many of the problems we face today stem from that systemic change.

Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: But is that alone sufficient?
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı: No—further steps are necessary.

Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: Does the CHP bear responsibility for the emergence of the Kurdish issue, and especially for its lack of resolution over the past 40 years?

Oğuz Kaan Salıcı: If we take 1980 as the starting point, you’ll recall there was a coup that year. Following the 1980 coup, the democratic system was completely dismantled, and all political parties were shut down. During that period, the Republican People’s Party—or the parties that carried on its political legacy—held power only briefly, and under the constraints of coalition governments.
Therefore, during the periods when the CHP was in government, it did not act as an obstacle to resolving the Kurdish issue. On the contrary, under all circumstances, it has strived to advance the democratic system—even while in opposition.
Today, one of the main reasons why Kurdish voters, both in western and eastern Turkey, are turning toward the CHP is this democratic struggle. What Turkey truly lacks is a strong democratic system. That system needs to be rebuilt. So, we reject the idea that it’s a choice between peace or democracy. There must be peace—no one should die. Turkey should prosper and become a welfare state. For this to happen, the path must be opened for democratic politics, and it must be followed with further democratic reforms.

Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: Within the framework of these democratic reforms, for example, do you view education in Kurdish as a right that should be recognized under individual rights?
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı: Currently, this issue is not explicitly addressed in our party’s official statements. But let me be clear: an individual’s mother tongue is part of their identity and dignity. Therefore, barriers to the development of language and culture must be removed. One of the essential paths to a free life is democratic rights; the other is the ability to access and express cultural capacities. The means to exercise those capacities must be made available.

All of this should be pursued within the framework of Turkey’s unity and territorial integrity. Let me be very clear: the Republican People’s Party has traditionally opposed federalism, and we continue to hold that position. However, we believe in the necessity of strengthening individual rights and resolving cultural issues. Efforts must be made to expand freedom of expression for both individuals and society.

Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: There is something that has really caught my attention. When we look at the discussions in Turkey, some argue that the process started due to external developments, while others attribute it to internal dynamics. What is clear, at least from the CHP’s perspective, is that we are entering a period of electoral campaigning. Time will tell whether elections will take place in 2028 or earlier, but I think we can agree that the CHP is shaping its policies with that goal in mind.
In that context, let me return to this question: Beyond crafting policies based on these values, in a strategy aimed at the elections and reaching Kurdish voters, if I ask you what the CHP promises specifically to the Kurds, what would your answer be?
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı: Let me put it this way: we don’t think it’s appropriate to view this issue solely in terms of “what does the CHP promise to Kurds?” We approach it from the perspective of “what does the CHP promise to everyone?”

Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: I understand.
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı:
We don’t view our Kurdish citizens solely as those living in the East and Southeast. Kurds also live in cities like Istanbul and İzmir. Even this morning, the results of Rawest’s research were announced: one-third of Kurdish voters, or one-third of the Kurdish population, live in western provinces. This indicates a socially mixed structure. If we aim to further develop this structure and advance social peace, we must formulate policies that include everyone. The democratic concerns of our citizen in Diyarbakır should be considered the same as those of our citizen in İzmir—and we must address them together. This is our perspective on the issue.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
I’ve had a question in mind for a while: There’s long been public expectation around whether the CHP would officially announce a solution project for the Kurdish issue. From what you’re saying, I understand that there is currently no visible project. Am I wrong?
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı:
You mentioned a study that could be carried out during Mr. İmamoğlu’s candidacy.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
That’s right, yes.
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı:
It’s not possible to know the content of that study right now, as Mr. İmamoğlu’s candidacy will be determined by the primary election to be held on the 23rd of this month. He is participating as the sole candidate. Therefore, I don’t have information about the work he is doing. However, the CHP’s traditional stance and past efforts toward resolving the Kurdish issue are evident. We can confidently express both our commitment and good intentions in this regard.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
Thank you very much, Mr. Salıcı. Welcome back, Mr. Ekmen. I’m not sure if it’s appropriate to ask such a question, but as a voter, when I heard President Erdoğan say at the AKP Congress, “We will also design the opposition,” I was quite concerned. As an opposition party, were you concerned by this? Also, do you think yesterday’s call and the potential changes it might bring provide the government with a new opportunity within the framework of this “designing the opposition” discourse?

Mehmet Emin Ekmen:
There’s a saying in Turkish: “One who has no doubts about their ablution has no doubts about their prayer.” Even if the President hasn’t explicitly stated such intentions, this tendency may have been observable for quite some time. Still, I cannot say that we, as the DEVA Party, are particularly concerned. However, let me clarify: In the DEVA Party, some individuals—including myself—have roots in the AK Party. Naturally, this background gives rise to certain suspicions, which can be unsettling.
If we are to talk about a “design” process, I believe we should first revisit what happened with the Good Party (İYİ Party). The developments there and potential changes could create a precedent for similar dynamics in other parties as well.
As for the recent call—it is certainly significant. The Republic of Türkiye has made at least 13 attempts to initiate negotiations for the disarmament of the PKK, four of which occurred during Erdoğan’s tenure. Each attempt failed for different reasons. Among these, the most compatible with international examples was likely the Oslo Process.
Previous efforts could be partially compared with global examples, but this current process might be the most unconventional so far. It bears little resemblance to either Türkiye’s 13 prior experiences or to international cases—from South Africa to Colombia, the Philippines to Ireland.
What’s also noteworthy is that this unusual process appears to have been initiated by Mr. Bahçeli. This suggests it’s not only about mobilizing nationalist voters or removing bureaucratic obstacles but also about Mr. Bahçeli’s unique political style. For example, in his speeches on October 22 and November 5, he casually referenced the “right to hope” and alluded to the possibility of Abdullah Öcalan making a statement in Parliament. That was remarkable.
During the previous resolution process—around 2013, if I recall correctly—there were over 40 visits to İmralı. The delegations were generally fixed, though they sometimes changed. In the current process, the goal shifted to concluding the talks by the second meeting. By the third, it was already being described as having “dragged on too long.”
Another interesting detail: the anticipated announcement scheduled for Friday was moved up to Thursday. To predict how this dynamic and unconventional process will unfold, what outcomes it might produce, and how it could reshape Turkish politics, you’d need the foresight of an astronomer—or a fortune teller.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
But isn’t this precisely the kind of situation we’re in? Apologies for interrupting. Until now, the existence of armed conflict in Türkiye has often been used as justification for political parties’ reluctance to propose solutions or adopt a discourse addressing the Kurdish issue. Now, you’re right—we don’t know whether the AKP or the MHP has a clear roadmap, and I’ll soon ask Mr. Kurt about this. But ultimately, if PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan makes such a call and—according to what we’ve heard—the PKK is prepared to comply, doesn’t that create new ground for parties like yours?
In other words, regardless of what the government does, if the shadow of armed conflict is lifted, doesn’t that open space for the opposition to formulate policies more freely? In this context, how would you define the DEVA Party’s Kurdish policy? Do you approach the issue from the perspective of individual rights or collective rights? Which framework aligns more closely with your party’s position? Please respond within this framework.
Mehmet Emin Ekmen:
Thank you. Indeed, the political implications of this call—for both Turkish and Kurdish politics—appear very positive. However, the reality is that this issue has long been considered sensitive, even dangerous, in Türkiye. There were times when discussing it carried the risk of being accused of having affiliations with the PKK, the DEM Party, or similar groups.
For instance, as early as 2020, the DEVA Party clearly outlined its main principles on this issue in its founding program. We confidently presented proposals in this area.
The first section of our party’s program focuses directly on rights and freedoms. Within the context of the Kurdish issue, the document includes clear provisions regarding constitutional citizenship, eliminating barriers to mother-tongue education, developing and protecting cultural rights, and strengthening local governance.
Even those provisions didn’t seem sufficient to us. Among our various action plans, the most comprehensive one is our Action Plan for Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Published about 18 months after our founding, it reaffirmed the same positions articulated in our program.
From our perspective, it may not be necessary to create something “new” in this area—we have already clearly presented our stance. Furthermore, our party’s Chair, Mr. Ali Babacan, has consistently emphasized an important distinction in his speeches: the Kurdish issue must be separated from the question of conflict resolution. The democratic reforms that the Republic of Türkiye must undertake for its citizens should not be conditioned on disarmament or any similar precondition. However, once those structural causes that gave rise to the PKK are addressed, then—as in other global examples—the PKK should be disarmed through a process of conflict resolution.
Mr. Babacan and our senior leadership have repeated this principle many times. It clearly defines our position. At the same time, I believe Turkish politics has reached a new and significant phase. For a long time, some politicians—though Turkish themselves and well aware of the issue—have censored themselves due to concerns over alienating the state bureaucracy or nationalist voters. We believe this era of hesitation can now come to an end.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: But it is also a fact that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been in power for the past 20 years. Let's set aside those 20 years; even in the past 5 years—or in just the last 1–2 years—practices such as appointing trustees (government officials) have continued.
Abdurrahman Kurt: I would also like to point out that I haven't held any official position for the past 15 years.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: Let me rephrase the question. You previously stated that you do not speak on behalf of the AKP, but…
Abdurrahman Kurt: I don't hold any position; if I did, I would speak accordingly.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: That's true. But as a Kurd from Diyarbakır, outside of all political affiliations, and as someone who has worked on this issue for many years, I want to ask you: In this moment, when everyone is expecting a significant step, what do you believe should be the first legal move?
Abdurrahman Kurt: My life has always been lived “el-menzilu beynel-menzileteyn”—in between two places. I was a “forbidden infantryman” in the military, and it was the same within the AKP. So here, I speak from a personal perspective—as someone who has been oppressed and who has lived this issue.
You cannot solve this matter through an ultra-nationalist state mentality. Equality cannot be achieved that way. I want to remind you of something: let’s revisit President Erdoğan’s speech in Diyarbakır on August 12, 2005. At that time, I was the head of the AKP’s Diyarbakır Provincial Branch.
One of the three key principles in that speech was: “States that cannot acknowledge their mistakes cannot become great states.” This means the state must confront its past wrongs. We must not shy away from acknowledging the events that have occurred—from Dersim to February 28, from 1924 to the present. These are systemic injustices rooted in the constitutional order. We need to confront them—just as Germany did. They preserve concentration camps, list victims’ names, display their belongings, and thus, reckon with their past. We need something similar.
But until today, we have not seen the CHP face what happened in Dersim or Zilan. So when people ask, “Why don’t you vote for the CHP?”—I refer to these examples and say: we have not seen a reckoning.
The second principle was: “Denial and assimilation are not solutions.” Today, outright denial has largely subsided, but it has not disappeared completely. For example, when we mention the name of our region, people say, “Kurd” is accepted, but “Kurdistan” is still taboo. This remains a barrier yet to be overcome.
Assimilation, particularly in language and education, still persists. As a Muslim and a human rights advocate, I say this is incompatible with my beliefs and with fundamental human rights.
The speech also emphasized the concept of constitutional citizenship. That was significant. But today, we are far from that point.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: So, if a legal step were to be taken today, should it be constitutional citizenship?
Abdurrahman Kurt: No, not today. Personally, yes, I would support that, but currently, there is no groundwork for it in Turkey. Turkish society has become highly nationalistic. This is partly due to the severe attacks the AKP has faced in recent years. The PKK’s betrayal during the resolution process further entrenched this social nationalism.
Today, small nationalist parties are able to push agendas larger than themselves. The political landscape has changed. If you use the same language you used in the past, you lose ground. Just look at the most recent meeting of the AKP’s High Executive Board—most of the new members have dominant nationalist identities. This cadre has been shaped by the current conditions.
Even Öcalan’s statements have become politically sensitive. I sense that even opposition parties now feel compelled to speak cautiously on this issue. This alone shows how much the landscape has shifted. In this environment, doing “Don Quixote-style” work that doesn't align with the times is pointless. First, the landscape must be fixed.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: Okay—who can fix it?
Abdurrahman Kurt: The only thing that can resolve this deadlock is the Kurdish political community. Kurds must assert their rights using reasonable and constructive language, and they must utilize their power at the ballot box with strategy and awareness. Let me be clear: no one gives anyone their rights as a gift. Whether they're Muslim or leftist—it doesn’t matter. No one gives anything freely. Expecting otherwise is a mistake.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: In that context, would you say Abdullah Öcalan’s message signifies that the Kurds have fulfilled their responsibility—or that they have offered an important opportunity?
Abdurrahman Kurt: Yes, we can say that. There is one truth that all of Turkey agrees on: weapons are toxic. Yes, weapons may create a hegemonic zone for parties like the HDP. But if you apply too much pressure, other parties may also begin to arm themselves. That is not democracy. That becomes a Lebanese-style system. A political system where every group relies on armed forces cannot be called a democracy.
Therefore, the shadow of weapons must be removed. Like every other group in this country, Kurds have diverse ways of thinking. None of us need to be identical. We need to be able to make decisions free from the shadow of weapons or the [PKK] organization. Just as we opposed military tutelage in Turkey, we must oppose organizational tutelage with the same resolve.
Lifting that shadow is a major achievement—not just for Kurds, but for Turkey as a whole. At this point, we have gained significant ground politically. I can say this: I’m tired of wearing camouflage. Today, if there are Kurdish studies departments at universities, if Kurdish is offered as an elective course, it is because of the political struggle we waged. It wasn’t achieved through weapons—it was achieved through politics. Through listening, speaking, and explaining.
Mr. Emin, the late Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, İhsan Arslan, and many others contributed greatly to this process. Today, there are people in this room who have devoted 40–50 years of their lives to this cause. If they haven’t given up, that’s our strength.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: So you're saying that those who will carry this forward are still the Kurds?
Abdurrahman Kurt: Absolutely. If we have finally arrived at the ballot box—something we have always wanted—then Kurds must use their electoral power consciously and wisely. Our people are in a state of demand. That’s where their strength lies.
But we must keep our demands within the realm of possibility. There is no value in crafting harsh rhetoric just to appear more radical. We need to identify what is achievable and then build a path toward future possibilities.
We must form alliances. But when doing so, we need to use a language that builds trust and is constructive. Another way to define the Kurdish issue is this: “The ability of Kurds to express their demands without triggering fear among Turks.” When we can achieve that balance, we create the foundation for peaceful coexistence.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: Thank you very much. Mr. Çandar, welcome back. As I mentioned and confirmed, I understood from Mr. Abdurrahman’s comments that if real peace is to be established, it will be the Kurds who will make it happen. If the Kurds do so, I believe this responsibility first falls on the shoulders of the DEM Party.
Now, following yesterday’s statement, we must first acknowledge that, up until today, it was the armed struggle that determined the political space available to the DEM Party—or to Kurdish parties that preceded it—and hung over them like a shadow. If I’m not mistaken, this even set boundaries for their opportunities, ultimately leading to the closure of seven or eight political parties.
In this context, regarding the DEM Party… Let me also add that one of the most emphasized issues in this process is the notion that the Turkish Grand National Assembly should become the platform for resolution.
I want to ask you, first, as a member of the DEM Party and a deputy representing Diyarbakır: can you say that the fears of party closure, trustee appointments, and arrests are now over? Second, although I didn’t receive a clear answer from Mr. Abdurrahman about legal steps, from the comments following yesterday’s statement, it appears that certain legal steps are anticipated. So, from the DEM Party’s perspective, what are those legal steps? And finally, what model does the DEM Party propose for resolving the Kurdish issue? What political framework does it advocate in addressing the matter? Please, go ahead

Cengiz Çandar: First, I would like to thank Rudaw for both inviting me here and for organizing this very successful, valuable, and important meeting. I must admit that it has been a long time since I participated in such a content-rich, insightful, and educational gathering.
Second, I’d like to clarify something as I begin answering these questions. Frankly, I shouldn’t have been on this panel. Ebru Günay, the Co-Spokesperson of the DEM Party, was supposed to be here, but she unfortunately became quite ill. I was present in my capacity as a DEM Party MP for another reason, and Ziryan Rojhelat felt it appropriate to have me join this session among our friends here. I mention this because my remarks may not officially represent the DEM Party. If DEM Party members hear what I say, they might respond, “No, that’s not our position; those are his personal views.” So let me clarify my position from the outset.
One more note: although I serve as a Member of Parliament from the DEM Party, my name is not officially registered with the party. In older terminology, I hold a “special status.” Just as Mr. Öcalan’s statement is uniquely his own, my explanation of these matters is also unique.
Now, let’s move directly to the questions without further elaboration. Regarding the legal aspects raised in yesterday’s statement and the DEM Party’s expectations—Sırrı Süreyya Önder, the Deputy Speaker of the Grand National Assembly and a DEM Party MP representing Istanbul, said on the panel yesterday: “Mr. Öcalan stated that for democratic politics to function, the state needs to enact certain legal reforms.” These words are not directly from Mr. Öcalan’s written message, but he specifically requested that they be conveyed. This was done with the knowledge of the state and is not an unexpected development.
What do we understand from this? To summarize, three main points emerge: According to our colleagues in the DEM Party, there are certain legal reforms that must be enacted. These pertain to the Law on the Execution of Sentences, as Mr. Öcalan specifically referred to legal regulations. This includes the situation of ill prisoners, which Mr. Öcalan considers a high priority.
Another issue concerns the laying down of arms and the dissolution of the PKK, as well as the legal status of PKK members. This issue directly involves our current location, as it particularly concerns Qandil.
Qandil lies within the territory of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Let us suppose that the PKK decides to dissolve itself tomorrow—what happens to the hundreds or even thousands of PKK members who are based here? Where will they go? What will their legal status be? Under which jurisdiction will they fall? Hence, legal regulations are needed to define the status of these individuals. New laws must be enacted, and the state—or rather, the authorities—must address this matter.
The third point involves legal arrangements that enable a transition to democratic politics. What does that mean? Suppose the armed struggle is over and the organization that waged it has declared: “We no longer exist; we have dissolved.” Does this mean the struggle for Kurdish rights and demands disappears as well? Through which legal mechanisms and democratic expressions will Kurds continue this struggle within Turkey’s political system? Legal safeguards and frameworks must be established to allow this.
Finally, let me say this: I see yesterday’s message as a historic statement—not merely because the DEM Party says so, but because, for a very simple and historical reason—in Turkey, an armed struggle began in 1984, represented by the PKK, which arose from the Kurdish issue. The authorities refer to it as terrorism.
Even Bülent Arınç—arguably the most moderate figure in the AKP—spoke here this morning and referred to it as terrorism. He said, “We have our Kurdish brothers, and there are also bad, terrorist people.” I personally don’t see it that way. The Turkish state may define the PKK as a terrorist organization, but I have never used that terminology. For me, it is a Kurdish uprising.
In the history of the Republic of Turkey, there have been several Kurdish uprisings. Since its founding in 1923, there have been large and small uprisings—such as the Sheikh Said Rebellion, Mount Ararat, and Dersim. Former President Süleyman Demirel once famously said, “There have been 29 Kurdish uprisings,” and he identified the PKK uprising as the most recent one.
The distinguishing feature of the PKK uprising is that it has been the longest, most continuous, most resilient, and most widespread Kurdish uprising in history. It has lasted for forty years and has yet to come to a definitive end. The historical significance of Mr. Öcalan’s statement yesterday is that it signals an end to this 40-year uprising—the longest and most resilient Kurdish uprising ever.
Let me conclude with a single sentence: Today, Erdoğan speaks of a “Turkey without terrorism,” and Devlet Bahçeli, who helped initiate this process, talks about “reviving the thousand-year Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood.” Meanwhile, those around the DEM Party speak of peace. Peace does not have winners or losers—it is a situation where everyone gains. The Turkish state should not view this as a victory, and the Kurdish side should not feel that they have lost everything and gained nothing. For the first time in the history of the Republic, the Kurds themselves are choosing to end an uprising they themselves initiated. That is what makes this moment significant.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: I have a question for you—not as a DEM Party MP—but as someone who has studied conflict resolution for many years and authored books on the topic. What kind of model can transform this moment into a sustainable peace? What framework would ensure that this opportunity is effectively utilized and results in a lasting solution to the Kurdish issue?
Cengiz Çandar: Before I answer your question, let me connect it to the previous topic. We talked about Mr. Öcalan’s call yesterday. In my view, there are two key elements in that message. One is that when viewed from the perspective of the authorities—whether Bahçeli, Erdoğan, or the state itself—the message addresses the foundational point of the current process. It states that…
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: At this point, I must remind you that you have 2–3 minutes left, in the interest of fairness and to respect the time allocated for the other speakers.
Cengiz Çandar: Understood. The Kurdish–Turkish relationship has a history stretching back more than a thousand years. For both peoples to survive and stand against hegemonic forces, they have always needed a mutually voluntary alliance. The message emphasizes that “we, as representatives of the Kurds, want to remain with the Turks by our own will.”
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: What form might that model take?
Cengiz Çandar: Before we delve into that model, to support my previous point, Mr. Öcalan states—just as any contemporary movement or party not forcibly dissolved should—“Hold your congress, integrate into society and the state, and make your decision sincerely.” He is calling for all groups to lay down arms, and for the PKK to dissolve itself—not under external pressure, but voluntarily. He explains: “We are doing this for the purpose of voluntary coexistence with Turkish society.”
He also says the path forward must be democratization—Turkey reaching a democratic structure and institutional framework. What we mean by democracy and democratization in Turkey is that from this point on, the Kurdish struggle—the fight for rights—must occur without armed struggle, within democratic structures.
That is what he envisions. As our colleagues emphasized earlier, from now on, political activity and organization in Turkey must operate outside the shadow of weapons.
The point we have reached is not the resolution of the Kurdish issue. In fact, this is not yet about resolving the issue—we haven’t even begun that conversation. But perhaps, from this point onward, we finally can. I apologize.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: Alright, time is up, but you didn’t answer this question. As everyone is taking their places, I’ll ask again. You, as Cengiz Çandar—the DEM Party parliamentarian—do you feel safe today, or do you believe there will never be a situation where your parliamentary immunity is lifted? In other words, can you say today that this matter is settled?
Cengiz Çandar: No.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: You cannot say that. Alright, thank you. Now, if the speakers agree… Let me also note that we were originally scheduled to finish at 4:10, but the organizers have said we may continue until 4:20. We’ll now take some questions from the audience. Please introduce yourself and ask your question.
First question from the audience:
Good evening, I’m Nuri Bekhalî, a journalist. Many thanks to the Rudaw Research Center and to the panelists. Regarding Mr. Öcalan’s call: I believe this is the umpteenth time he has taken such an initiative. He has previously announced unilateral ceasefires, but the state has not responded adequately.
Now, with this call demanding the laying down of arms and the dissolution of the PKK, how will the Turkish state build trust and offer assurances to the Kurds that their rights will be protected within the constitutional framework?
Secondly, wouldn’t it be better if a third party, such as the United Nations or another neutral state, were to monitor the success of the peace process?
And another question: Is Turkey prepared—following Öcalan’s call—to raise awareness within Turkish society regarding Kurds? Because it's not only the state that refuses to see Kurds as equals; many ordinary Turkish citizens still don’t accept Kurds. How can societal awareness be transformed to align with the perspective of individuals like Cengiz Çandar, Dr. İsmail Beşikçi, and Cemal, rather than maintaining a view that Kurds have no right to exist?
Second question from the audience:
Good day. I’d like to direct my question to the CHP representative. The CHP has a discourse—let’s not call it traditional, but rather repetitive—regarding the Kurdish issue in Türkiye. This discourse contributes to the persistence of the nationalist wave that has intensified in recent years.
This seems to stem from the CHP’s tendency to position itself outside the process. What will the CHP do this time to avoid remaining on the sidelines of this developing process? What changes will it make to its rhetoric and policy?
Third question from the audience:
Greetings and respect to all. We are truly honored to be here today. I have a timely question for the representatives from Türkiye.
One gentleman from the CHP mentioned that he personally supports mother-tongue education. Yet, the CHP—despite defining itself as a progressive, social democratic, and even a 24-carat Kemalist party—still has not officially accepted mother-tongue education in its party program.
Similarly, another gentleman from the Justice and Development Party does not support the right to self-determination.
We live in the 21st century, where the most basic human rights include freedom and the right to self-determination—principles affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nearly 80 years ago.
Given that Türkiye’s GDP has surpassed $1,000 per capita, and that it is now a regional power, an EU partner, and a NATO ally, can this country—despite all its strength—not revise its mentality to recognize Kurds as a nation, just as Turks are recognized as a nation? Don't Kurdish children also deserve the right to study in their mother tongue? That was my question—thank you.
Fourth question from the audience:
Let me ask my question in English. My name is Zozan Alush, and I’m from northeastern Syria.
The truth is, we have been closely monitoring the peace process in Türkiye. My question is: What impact will this process have on the relationship between northeastern Syria and Damascus?
We believe Türkiye now holds considerable power and influence in Syria. So, regardless of whether it is acknowledged openly or not, this peace process in Türkiye will have an impact on our situation as Kurds in Syria.
My question is: How will this process affect the dialogue between Commander Mazloum and Ahmed al-Sharaa?
Fifth question from the audience:
First, I would like to address Mr. Oğuz Kaan Salıcı. We are aware that the PKK emerged as a result of unresolved issues. With that in mind, what is your view on the matter of Kurdish rights under the 1961 Constitution and the founding Constitution of the Republic? Is the CHP avoiding responsibility in this regard? That was for Mr. Salıcı.
Next, I would like to ask a question to both the former and current members of Parliament from the AK Party tradition. As you know, Mr. Mehmet Emin participated in a previous meeting we held. Two key topics were discussed there: cultural rights and matters related to the mother tongue. To what extent can the AK Party tradition offer a solution in this regard?
Finally, I would like to ask Mr. Cengiz Çandar about his presentation in the context of Syria. As is known, Commander Mazloum made a statement in Kobani, saying that developments related to the PKK have nothing to do with them. Could this position damage the peace process? Or, on the contrary, could it serve as a step forward? I would appreciate your thoughts. Thank you.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: I will now repeat the questions. The first was addressed to Oğuz Kaan Salıcı. It touched on the rise of Turkish nationalist sentiment—an issue not only relevant to Türkiye but to the entire world. How do you evaluate this situation, and where do you see yourself in this process? It seems your earlier remarks sparked many follow-up questions. Let’s begin with this, and then we’ll move on to the other questions.
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı: If we approach this as a process, yes, it is necessary. But at the moment, there is no defined framework. We didn’t know in advance what yesterday’s call would entail. My guess is that other parties didn’t know either—perhaps even the AK Party.
We were aware that a clarification would be made. There was something happening; a process was in motion. The DEM Party delegation that visited İmralı later briefed us, as well as other parties.
We want to be optimistic. We want to view this process in good faith. But there is no clear structure in place. A table has been set—but where do we stand at that table? That remains uncertain. The messenger is not to blame.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: Does the Republican People’s Party (CHP) take any responsibility at this point? That’s the essence of the question, as I understand it. In other words, independent of what the government is doing, will the CHP—as a main opposition party aspiring to power—continue to keep its distance? Or, to borrow the phrasing of another questioner, is it running away from responsibility?
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı: We are not avoiding responsibility. We do not deliberately position ourselves outside the process. But here’s the question: Why isn’t Mr. Erdoğan speaking, friends? Who is running the country? Mr. Erdoğan has been in power for 22 years. What is his stance on this issue? I want to know. Don’t you want to know?
Where does Mr. Erdoğan stand? Where is the Justice and Development Party in all of this? I want to know. You naturally ask where the main opposition stands. I ask you—where is the government? We know where Devlet Bahçeli stands; his position is clear. But we don’t know the government’s stance. In the previous process, attempts were made to exclude the main opposition. I mentioned this in my earlier remarks, quoting Mr. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz: Isn’t the Republican People’s Party (CHP) an independent political force, capable of formulating its own policy irrespective of the government’s stance? I’m asking this purely from a political science perspective: Shouldn’t the CHP, as a political actor, establish its position autonomously?
Oğuz Kaan Salıcı:
The Republican People’s Party (CHP), with sincere intentions, transparency, and commitment to resolving the Kurdish issue, will not obstruct or stand in the way of the process. As for its position in this process, that will become clearer in the coming days as further steps are taken. The party’s initial response following Öcalan’s call was not negative. On the contrary, it reflected and reaffirmed the party’s historically constructive stance. This suggests the potential for an even more positive approach in the future.
However, the critical question remains: where does President Erdoğan stand in this process? This should be our main focus.
Another question was raised by a friend regarding the 1961 Constitution and historical responsibility. There is indeed a certain understanding, and this understanding has been largely shaped by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) over the past 20 years.
If there is a dictatorial tendency in Turkey, or if election results are interfered with, that is a product of the mindset attributed to the Republican People’s Party—at least as portrayed by the AKP. However, it was not the CHP that drafted the 1961 Constitution. Nor did it draft the 1982 Constitution.
If the CHP must assume historical responsibility, it will do so. It does not fear this. Let us also not forget what Mr. Abdurrahman Kurt rightly emphasized: he referred to President Erdoğan’s 2005 speech, saying, “How I wish that had been given in 2025.” Twenty years have passed since then.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
I wish the CHP had not aligned with the AKP in lifting parliamentary immunities. Thank you very much.
Now, a question was directed at participants from the AKP tradition, particularly a specific one. I would like to hear answers from both of you. Then, all three panelists are asked to respond to a question concerning Rojava, specifically the Rojava–Mazloum Abdi dialogue, which was also raised by a third participant. Please go ahead.
Mehmet Emin Ekmen:
The question addressed how we can anticipate the AKP’s stance on cultural rights and the mother tongue.
Let’s acknowledge this: many of the reforms implemented by the AKP between 2002 and 2013 are considered revolutionary in the context of the Republic’s history. It began with 45 minutes of Kurdish-language programming on TRT and expanded to TRT Kurdi.
There were elective Kurdish language courses, the establishment of Kurdish language institutes under the name of “living languages,” and, starting in 2013, broader implementation of such courses. However, although these elective rights exist, due to administrative obstacles, they have not been fully utilized—despite millions of Kurdish children needing access.
Current figures range between 27,000 and 37,000 students enrolled. In my view, education in one’s mother tongue is one of the most critical red lines in President Erdoğan’s thinking.
We know he has had many objections in the past—shaped by public and bilateral dialogues—especially concerning the lifting of the ban in Article 42.
Today, Turkey has shifted from a rights-based system to one based on mercy and benevolence over the past six or seven years.
What I mean is this: if you demand your rights directly from Erdoğan and Bahçeli—whether concerning the Kurds or statutory decrees—you may not only be denied but also punished.
However, if you submit to their goodwill and moral sense, you might gain more than expected.
You emphasized both collective and individual rights. In his announcement yesterday, Öcalan stated that collective rights do not require a separate state or federalism. Then, a new term emerged: “culturalist.” This word, which doesn’t exist in Turkish dictionaries, seems to be a linguistic gift to the Turkish language, symbolizing a cultural approach behind existing organizations. It has become an acceptable term in this system of symbolic concessions: “If you retreat enough, I will give you this.”
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
So, do you believe the likelihood of the AKP responding to Kurdish overtures with another gesture is low?
Mehmet Emin Ekmen:
I don’t find it unusual. But sadly, this is not being discussed within a legal framework—it is being evaluated within the context of the current governance style.
There will not be a neutral third party. Let me clarify: I hope there won’t be one. But if the PKK positively responds to this call and wishes to lay down arms—with a formula allowing some of its members to remain in Turkey and others elsewhere—then third countries and international organizations will have to join the process.
Not as mediators, but as participants in the disarmament effort—managing issues like how and where the weapons in Qandil will be handled.
As for developments in Syria, I see them progressing positively. The signals between Ahmad Jarba and Mazloum Abdi are encouraging. Most of Turkey’s accusations are being invalidated by Mazloum Abdi’s statements. Therefore, I hope a truly pluralistic and democratic constitution can emerge from Syria’s internal dynamics—without Turkish intervention.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
Thank you. I believe you have thoroughly covered the AKP tradition. So if you don’t mind, let’s turn to this question: What impact will this process have on the situation in Rojava? And is there a third party involved?
Abdurrahman Kurt:
Let me put it this way. When I look at the years from 2002 to 2013, I see that President Erdoğan endured significant challenges for this cause.
I’ll never forget: after his 2005 speech, we traveled to Söğüt together. During the attacks against him, we physically shielded him. He was pelted with stones and sticks by members of the Nationalist Front. Yet he stood firm. By the time he reached the 2011 phase of the process, he felt betrayed. Despite everything he had done—initiating reforms unprecedented in the Republic’s 80-year history—he was vilified.

He was demonized by those who claimed to champion democratic values. Naturally, as a human being, he has emotional reactions. And yes, these reactions can hurt us as well. But what Mr. Ekmen said is very accurate: President Erdoğan has a unique quality. If you can explain yourself clearly, stay on topic, and be persistent—while respecting boundaries—he might surprise you with an unexpected response. TRT Kurdi is a good example. Initially, we pushed to increase Kurdish broadcasts from 30 minutes to six hours. Even friends from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) supported this. Once convinced, Erdoğan extended it to 24 hours. That’s why I say: always leave room for hope.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
Mr. Abdurrahman, could you briefly clarify your view on the impact of this process on Rojava and the role of a third party?
Abdurrahman Kurt:
I agree that the possibility of a “third eye” is weak. In this context, Turkey, Damascus, and Mazloum Abdi are central. As you know, yesterday Salih Muslim made a significant statement:
“If we are allowed to operate as a political party, we are ready to lay down arms.” That’s a powerful statement and deserves to be taken seriously.
Now, when we compare this with Turkey’s rhetoric, if Turkey truly implements this principle—that “the government must include everyone, and no minority should be excluded; everyone should feel part of the state”—then I believe the potential for a solution is strong. Both sides are moving in parallel directions.
Dr. Arzu Yılmaz:
Our time is almost up, but please, Mr. Cengiz, go ahead. Could you briefly summarize your view on the role of a third party and its impact on Rojava?
Cengiz Çandar:
The situation in Rojava is as follows. Just as we began this panel, Ömer Çelik, the spokesperson for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), made a statement.
About an hour ago, he declared that the PKK and all its affiliated organizations—such as the PYD and YPG, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in both Arabic and Kurdish—must lay down their arms and disband. Yesterday, Mazloum Abdi responded by saying that this has nothing to do with us and that they support Öcalan’s call. Salih Muslim, the co-chair of the PYD, echoed the same: they fully support Öcalan’s statement, but emphasized that it concerns Turkey, not them.
So, what can be concluded from this AKP statement and the responses? Let me reiterate what I said on the first day of this panel: The situation will be shaped less by what Turkey says or what Öcalan declares, and more by whether the United States stays in Syria. If the U.S. remains, Turkey’s ability to intervene militarily will be limited. If the U.S. withdraws, Turkey may increase its interventions. However, if a political agreement is reached between Mazloum Abdi, the SDF, and Ahmad Jarba or the Damascus government, this will initiate a different phase altogether. That is where we should focus our attention.