Both the ceasefire and the political arrangement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Interim Government remain fragile. With fewer than ten days left before the ceasefire expires, developments on the ground—together with the broader political and military dynamics of the Middle East—suggest that the situation is moving toward further transformation. Viewed more broadly, it is increasingly clear that the issue of Rojava- formally the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria- is no longer merely an “internal Syrian matter.” Rather, the developments there have already triggered significant shifts in the dynamics of the regional conflicts.
Following a joint statement by the United States, France, Britain, and Germany emphasizing the need to halt hostilities and make the ceasefire permanent, another meeting was held on Tuesday, January 27, between Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Elham Ahmed, co-chair of the Department of Foreign Relation of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava), with Asaad al-Shaibani, Syria’s Foreign Minister. The talks reportedly took place in a “positive” atmosphere. Another meeting is expected within the next 24 hours, provided no changes occur on the ground.
Based on the experience of previous agreements—most notably those reached on March 10, 2025, and January 18 of this year—both sides appear to have lost confidence in each other’s assurances. As a result, they have refrained from making official announcements until concrete steps are taken. Nevertheless, the question of integrating the SDF into the Syrian army remains a major point of contention. Damascus favors a model whereby part of the SDF would be absorbed into police or internal security forces, while the remainder would join the army as individual recruits. By contrast, the Kurdish side prefers to retain several organized brigades within a dedicated anti-terrorism framework, alongside internal security forces.
Also under discussion are revenue-sharing arrangements, the education system, and constitutional guarantees for the Kurdish language—specifically whether it would be recognized as a national or an official language. Another sensitive issue concerns the status of PKK members in Rojava, where some progress appears to have been made, as most parties continue to describe the negotiations as constructive despite ongoing ceasefire violations.
Under the January 18 agreement, the Kurds were expected to receive the governorship of Hasakah and the post of Deputy Defense Minister. However, recent information suggests that discussions have also included the possibility of offering a Deputy Foreign Minister position or another senior role within the Foreign Ministry. That said, given Syria’s current political reality—where agreements are often concluded quickly and abandoned just as swiftly—such developments should be approached with caution rather than optimism.
Potential Military Scenarios Following a Failed Agreement
If negotiations fail, our assessment of the situation on the ground points to the following scenarios:
First: The Syrian army is expected to tighten its siege on Kobani. At the same time, it may attempt to advance toward the northern border from the Krizero and Çil Axa/Al-Jawadiyah axes in eastern Hasakah. The apparent objective of this maneuver would be to sever the geographical link between the cities of Qamishli and Derik.
Second: To consolidate this situation, the Syrian army may seek to exploit either the ongoing siege or the mobilization of segments of the Arab population in the area. It is also important to note that part of the army’s advances east of the Euphrates after January 17 resulted not from direct military confrontation, but from a shift in the position of the al-Sanadid Forces which are a tribal militia primarily composed of members of the Shammar tribe in northeastern Syria (Hasakah region) —an Arab tribal component within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Third: Due to its proximity to the Kurdistan Region, this border line constitutes a vital artery for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). It is essential both for securing daily supplies and for functioning as a humanitarian corridor. Consequently, the loss of this line would significantly undermine the SDF’s defensive capabilities. That said, the area’s demographic composition—distinct from that of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor—may work in the SDF’s favor by enabling a more sustained and resilient defense.
Fourth: Although Murat Karayılan, a senior PKK figure, has hinted at the possibility of resorting to “tunnel warfare,” comparisons with Hamas’s experience in Gaza raise doubts about the effectiveness of this tactic in Rojava. The primary reason lies in the region’s geography: it lacks strategic depth, and in some areas its width is no more than 20 to 25 kilometers, which severely constrains the military utility of such methods.
The United States and the New Regional Security Architecture
In reality, neither the war nor the prospect of a Syria–Rojava agreement can be understood in isolation from the broader framework of the new regional security architecture over which the United States has taken the lead. This architecture rests on several interconnected pillars: weakening the so-called Shiʿa axis by promoting the emergence of a Sunni crescent—one in which jihadist and Hanafi Sunni actors play a more prominent role—stretching from Afghanistan to Syria; reinforcing Turkey and Qatar as key regional players; and safeguarding Israel’s military and strategic supremacy. Collectively, these objectives also serve to curb the expanding influence of China and Russia in the region.
Viewed through this lens, Syria’s current trajectory becomes clearer. From Donald Trump’s perspective, what is unfolding can be framed as Ahmad al-Sharaa’s attempt to impose stability, a development that aligns with U.S. strategic priorities in several important ways:
First: He can withdraw his forces from Syria after a period, which has been on his mind since 2019.
Second: The existence of a stable Sharaa government in Syria makes it easier to facilitate an Israeli-Arab arrangement that includes a border agreement between Lebanon-Israel as well as Syria-Israel. Trump is the engineer of the creation of Arab-Israeli alliance through the Abraham Accords and may also desire a Turkish-Israeli arrangement. In this equation, America's abandonment of the SDF, which Tom Barrack officially announced, was one of those "achievements" that Ankara had been requesting for years. Perhaps Turkey's participation in Trump's "peace board" in Gaza is a green light signaling the possibility of normalization with Israel, even if indirect.
Third: Sharaa’s control over Syria’s borders with Iraq would allow the project of constructing a major barrier against Iran’s regional influence to expand. Washington may calculate that, in the absence of U.S. forces, the SDF would be compelled to align with Shiite groups in Iraq and Iran in order to ensure its survival. During the Syrian civil war, however, the SDF—despite tensions between the United States on the one hand and Iran and Russia on the other—maintained open channels with rival actors. It refrained from confronting Iran, Shiite militias, or even Russia, while simultaneously operating alongside U.S. forces. The SDF’s experience demonstrates that, in the Middle Eastern arena of great-power competition, “neutrality” is exceedingly difficult to sustain—yet choosing sides carries its own costs.
Iran and Iraq
From the perspective of Iran and Shiite political forces in the Middle East, the recent upheavals in Syria are viewed as part of a broader containment strategy directed against them by Turkey, Sunni Arab states, and the United States—one that aligns closely with Trump’s policy of “deterrence” and the curbing of Iranian influence. The Syrian army’s more assertive presence along Iraq’s borders has revived a long-standing anxiety within the Shiite street, articulated through the discourse of “the return of the Umayyad army.” This narrative reflects fears that Ahmad al-Sharaa may ultimately set his sights on Iraq’s Sunni triangle—and potentially even Baghdad—over the longer term.
Shiite political actors now perceive themselves as encircled by what they describe as a Sunni siege stretching from Afghanistan, passing through Syria—with Gulf as a key intermediary—and extending to Turkey. Within this arc, two longstanding jihadist–Hanafi Sunni poles, the Taliban and al-Sharaa, are seen as aligning on the same side of the regional divide. The termination of the U.S. alliance with the SDF—widely viewed as facilitating the stabilization of Sharaa’s rule, much as occurred in Afghanistan—thus represents another link in the chain of policies aimed at containing Iran and Iran-aligned groups in Iraq.
This context may help explain why Iraq’s Coordination Framework, reacting to recent developments, moved to nominate Nouri al-Maliki for the presidency of the Council of Ministers, although it remains unclear whether this nomination will endure in light of Trump’s recent statements. Previously, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked that Maliki was appointed prime minister because “his position was weak,” Perhaps this is the reason for Trump's current opposition to Maliki's return; meaning that in the past Maliki's weakness was his strength, but now his strength is his weakness and not desired by United States!
For Iraq, the current situation in Rojava has reignited the ISIS issue. Under the pretext of controlling ISIS members and retaining a bargaining chip with the United States and the international coalition, Baghdad agreed to assume custody of ISIS prisoners. Prior to the recent upheavals, approximately 5,000 Iraqi ISIS detainees were held in six prisons across Syria and Rojava, alongside roughly 5,000 Syrian ISIS members and 2,000 foreign fighters. It appears that Iraq agreed to take responsibility for the Iraqis and the foreigners, but this has generated a critical concern: in the event of a hypothetical conflict between Iran and Israel, or Iran and the United States, would Iraq be able to secure these facilities effectively? Perhaps one of United States’ objectives was to kill two birds with one stone: in the post-"SDF" phase, on one hand, not having to leave ISIS members in the hands of a Syria where there are doubts about both the intent and capability of its government regarding old jihadists. Here, not everything is black or white—Trump and Sharaa may agree on many issues, but undoubtedly, they also have points of difference. On the other hand, with the presence of around 7,000 ISIS prisoners, the strengthening of Sunni politics, Sharaa's arrival at the borders, and the United States’ political, diplomatic, and economic pressure, the government in Baghdad is forced to think twice before taking any position regarding potential conflicts between United States and Iran.
Turkey and the Situation in Rojava
For Turkey, the war paved the way for it to achieve much of what it wanted: the Autonomous Administration and the SDF, according to the geographical and compositional definition at the time of their establishment, no longer exist. Control over significant portions of the borders, as well as key oil and water resources along with Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, was returned to the Syrian government, while ISIS prisoners were transferred to Iraq. In this context, the SDF no longer represented a “strategic threat” from Ankara’s perspective. At the same time, however, the conflict sparked a resurgence of Kurdish nationalism—a development Ankara had sought to suppress for over a year through Öcalan and the PKK disarmament process. This war provided a rare boost to Kurdish nationalist sentiment and added another dimension to the enduring sense of “historical oppression” among Kurds in the Middle East, one that cannot be offset by Damascus’s military victories or the achievements of any other state. It is likely that regional powers are closely monitoring this dynamic. This may also help explain the efforts of Syria’s current government to reassure Kurds that “their rights will be protected.”
Turning Points in Kurdish Politics
The situation in Rojava has also prompted a shift in internal Kurdish politics, with Barzani re-emerging as the central reference point for addressing the Kurdish issue in the Middle East. This resurgence may not align with Öcalan’s vision. During a meeting with a Turkish parliamentary delegation, Öcalan reportedly stated: “What Devlet Bahçeli represents for Turkish nationalism, I represent it among the Kurds of the Middle East.” In that discussion, he linked the Kurdish question to broader geopolitical rivalries and Israeli interests, even though the Kurdish issue predates the establishment of Israel.
Öcalan's proposal for an arrangement between the SDF and the Syrian government is realistic given the current situation in Rojava (Western Kurdistan)—although there were greater opportunities previously—which involves converting the SDF forces into internal security, revenue sharing, and some form of administrative decentralization. However, current developments indicate that any political agreement concerning Rojava’s future must also involve external players beyond Öcalan’s party to have a say in the Kurdish issue in Rojava.
The essence of Öcalan’s “ideological transformation,” built on the principles of the “brotherhood of peoples” and the rejection of solutions based on territorial control, has encountered significant setbacks. The vision that sought to govern one-third of Syria’s territory and unite diverse communities solely through ideological frameworks did not succeed in the Rojava experience. Moreover, it remains a central puzzle how the principles of Democratic Republic can accommodate the coexistence of two ideologically incompatible forces—the old Islamic-jihadist current and the Marxist-Leninist current.
Beyond its impact on internal Kurdish politics, the Kurdish community now finds itself at a historic crossroads. It faces a delicate balancing act: either maintain a precarious neutrality or risk isolation by taking sides among the region’s competing poles. The central question is no longer merely the future of Kurds in Syria or the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army. Rather, it is: where is the Kurdish condition headed amid the dynamics of the “Sunni Crescent,” “Shiite containment,” and the emerging regional security architecture?
