گەڕان بۆ baban

On May 19, 2025, the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Kurdistan Regional Government signed two contracts in Washington for the development of both the Miran and Kurdamir fields with HKN and Western Zagros. Four months before that date, Iraq's Ministry of Oil signed a memorandum of understanding in London for the development of four Kirkuk oil fields with British BP, and subsequently, on February 26 and March 26, 2025, all contracts were signed for BP to begin operations in Kirkuk.

The Kurdistan Region has the capacity to produce over 6,700 megawatts of electricity and currently generates 4,300 megawatts, indicating it still has the potential to produce an additional 2,400 megawatts. In the event of an interruption in Iranian electricity and gas supplies due to American pressure, Iraq could benefit from this surplus, just as it presently purchases 1,600 megawatts from the Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, the Kurdistan Region is expected to make a significant advancement in gas production early next year, reaching one billion cubic meters. Whether Iraq opts to purchase the gas directly or it is converted to electricity for export, Iraq can rely on the Kurdistan Region in this regard.

In 2023, 214 oil production fields and oil refinery locations were identified in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region that had high temperature and carbon dioxide emission density levels, which was a result of the burning of associated gas from these locations. During field visits to these sites located in the governorates of the Kurdistan Region, it was observed that the amounts reported in the data reflected the intensity and density of the flames from the pipes that were installed for burning the gas.

All eyes were on the tripartite meeting in Baghdad that took place last week between international oil companies (IOC) and officials from Erbil and Baghdad, which ended without results. This comes after Baghdad had previously announced that the resumption of Kurdistan Region oil exports via pipeline would happen in the coming hours. This did not happen because the international oil companies that have invested in the Kurdistan Region and produce approximately two-thirds of the total Kurdistan Region oil are not willing to put oil into the pipeline under the current terms agreed upon between Baghdad and Erbil.

Beyond the importance of the disputes between Erbil and Baghdad on this issue, there are two other important questions: Iraq's perspective on energy issues (oil and gas), and the importance of Kirkuk's oil reserves and BP's continuous efforts to invest in Kirkuk's oil fields during the era of net zero and transition to renewable energy

The amount of money sold, domestically and internationally, by the Central Bank in dollars this year has exceeded $62 billion, resulting in the receipt of dinars in equivalent proportion, averaging approximately 80.6 trillion dinars for the year. Non-oil revenues generated from taxes, fees, and customs by the end of October 2024 amounted to 14.3 trillion dinars. Combined, these revenues total around 95 trillion dinars. However, by the end of October, Iraq's total expenditures had reached 122 trillion dinars. With two months of expenditures still unaccounted for, it is evident that the dinar reserves derived from oil-based dollar revenues have been exhausted.

The causes of depreciation in neighboring currencies vary. The decline of the Iranian rial is attributed to external factors, including US and European sanctions. The Turkish lira's depreciation stems from a growing fiscal deficit, budget imbalances, and political stances taken by the AKP in response to regional developments. Meanwhile, the collapse of the Syrian pound can be traced to ongoing war, instability, economic sanctions, and uncertainty surrounding the emerging Jolani-led state. Why does the Iraqi currency fluctuate daily in the market, consistently trading at over 20,000 dinars above the Central Bank's official rate for every $100?

The three-year Iraqi budget provided a comprehensive framework for the country’s revenues and expenditures based on initial estimates. However, the recent census has corrected these estimates, revealing significant discrepancies. As the time approaches to amend and approve the 2025 budget tables, it is imperative to review expenditures, provincial allocations, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) budget, and revenue projections.

Two critical questions arise from this situation. First, are the international oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region willing to hand over the total oil production at the newly increased cost? Second, how can Iraq export oil from the Kurdistan Region when it is required to reduce both its overall exports and production to comply with OPEC Plus agreements?

In its annual report, "World Economic Outlook,"[1] the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects a 4.1% GDP growth rate for Iraq in 2025. This forecast aligns with a stable global growth rate of 3.2% across 195 countries, although developing countries, including Iraq, are expected to experience a higher growth trajectory, from a low 0.1% to a notable 4.1%. Although this projection is optimistic, it raises an important question: what factors have led the IMF to foresee such growth for Iraq?

In fact, the reasons behind the fluctuations in the value of the dollar in Iraq, as we see these days, there may be other stories about the Iraqi dollar, in cash, going out to other countries, but not through the dollar markets in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Basra, and Baghdad because what is presented in cash and the central bank's figures is less than half the value of Iranian exports to Iraq, let alone the Iranian state through the market to get dollars.

In contrast to the International Energy Agency's forecast for the future of oil, OPEC predicts a 24 percent increase in energy demand by 2050, primarily driven by non-OECD countries, with India and China being the main contributors to this surge. According to OPEC, coal will be the only energy source to see a decline in demand over the next 25 years, while global daily oil demand is expected to reach 120 million barrels per day.

In 2023, according to Iraq’s revenue and expenditure report, 93% of the country’s total revenue emanated from oil, amounting to 125.8 trillion dinars. In contrast, non-oil revenue stood at just 9.7 trillion dinars, or 7% of the total, a sharp deviation from the budget’s initial projections for oil and non-oil revenues.

This $800 million project, which is over three-quarters complete, is now abandoned or expected to be completed by the end of this year. This analysis explores whether the increase in gas production, which has significant demand both inside and outside the Kurdistan Region, represents an opportunity or a challenge for the region's future.

The country’s rapid rise from Third World status to a global superpower, lifting 800 million people out of poverty within a single generation (World Bank, April 1, 2022)[ii], serves as a model for developing nations. Nevertheless, developing countries are eager for the changes brought by China’s infrastructure initiatives, but China’s approach to assistance differs from others as Chinese experts emphasize. “We’re not like the Americans; we can’t offer help for free because our country is still developing,”. However, with long-term loans and Chinese workforces, they believe they can assist in building infrastructure abroad. This duality makes China's presence in developing countries both an opportunity and a potential threat.