The court's twenty-page verdict offers an in-depth, holistic analysis of the reasons for the rejection of Law No. 12 of 2022, drawing on the internal regulations of the Kurdistan Regional Parliament
The quota seat issue has never been a primary concern in the parties' internal disputes as it is today. The international community and internal negotiations have consistently failed to find a solution
According to the survey findings, young people in the Kurdistan Region have a significant financial, social, and even safety bond with their families. A remarkable 90% of young people do not want to leave their families, and 52% rely on them for financial support. When faced with difficulties, 66% said they would seek assistance from family and relatives, while just 33% would turn to formal government organizations.
According to the Survey findings, 43.9% of young people in the Kurdistan Region are employed, 26.6% are students, and 15.7% are housewives. The unemployment rate among young individuals is 13.6%, while it is 0.2% among the disabled and ill. There is a significant gender gap in employment, with 61.5% of males and only 16.1% of females working. The unemployment rate among females is 13.5%. Soran has the highest rate of employed youth (51.7%), followed by Zakho (50%) and Raperin (47%). Erbil has a high percentage of employed youth (46.8%), followed by Sulaymaniyah (42.2%) and Duhok (41%). Halabja has the lowest employment rate, followed by Garmian. Garmian has the highest rate of youth unemployment at 29.6%, followed by Duhok at 21.8%, Raparin, and Zakho at 16.7%.
Youth participation in civil society activities (NGO) and political parties has seen an increase in the Kurdistan Region, following a trend observed in Europe. According to the survey, 86.9% of young people have not previously engaged in civil society or political party activities. This percentage rises to 91% among the 15-24 age group, indicating a substantial gap between young individuals and political parties/civil society organizations. However, when asked about their active involvement in such activities within the past 12 months, 55.5% of young people reported participating in political organizations or party-related events. In the Garmian Independent Administration, 100% of youth were engaged in political parties, while in the Raperin Independent Administration, the highest percentage of young people participated in civil society groups (100%). Notably, the level of non-participation in the past, particularly in the independent administrations of Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, Raperin, and Garmian, exceeded 90%, but this has changed in the last 12 months.
There is a divided opinion among young people regarding the future political landscape in the Kurdistan Region. Approximately 36.8% anticipate deterioration, while 46.9% believe that things will improve, and the remaining respondents expect the situation to remain unchanged. Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, Garmian, and Raperin have the highest percentages of individuals who expect the situation to worsen, with 67.3% in Raperin and 66.7% in Garmian. In contrast, 70.7% in Soran and 50.9% in Zakho foresee progress.
Young people aged 15-29 constitute a significant portion of the population in the Kurdistan Region, accounting for 28% or 1,727,903 individuals. Additionally, approximately 35% of the population in the region is under the age of 15, accounting for 2,159,879, highlighting the continued presence and influence of the young population for the next two decades. This demographic dynamic has important implications for the labor force, wealth distribution, job opportunities, and political participation. Understanding the perspectives of young people on economic, social, and political matters is crucial as it can shape the future of society.
Undoubtedly, The ongoing discussions among the political parties in the Kurdistan Region in the context of the efforts towards reconciliation, particularly concerning the Kurdistan parliamentary elections, is a multifaceted matter.
The KRI's water crisis is a result of a combination of challenges that demand attention and innovative strategies for resolution. This article explores five crucial factors that play a role in the crisis and possible routes to tackle these challenges.
The upcoming elections hold the potential for unexpected results, as revealed by the poll, primarily due to several factors related to voter demographics and changing population figures in the Kurdistan Region. In the 2018 Kurdistan Parliamentary elections, the voter count stood at 3,085,461. Since then, the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has projected the number of voters to be 3,227,551 for 2021, and currently, it stands at 3,641,000 voters. Certainly, in anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary elections, set to take place on February 25, 2024, as per the most recent directive issued by President Nechirvan Barzani, the projected number of voters is expected to rise.
Based on the survey findings, among those who haven’t previously participated in elections, men exhibited a higher registration rate compared to women. Focusing on various age groups, young individuals aged 18-24 stood out with the most substantial enrollment rate at 52.6%. At the provincial level, Soran secured the highest registration percentage at 72.4%, followed by Zakho at 68.7%, Erbil at 58.3%, and Duhok at 52.4%. Conversely, Sulaymaniyah, Garmian, Raperin, and Halabja recorded the lowest proportions of individuals expressing a reluctance to participate, with only 20% of respondents indicating their registration for the upcoming elections.
The survey outcomes reveal a notable trend, the initial victors in the forthcoming election appear to be those who abstain from participating, the ambiguous “undecided voters,” and those who cast empty votes. This intricate distribution encompasses 39.7% of citizens opting to abstain, 29.2% willing to participate but withholding their votes, and an additional 3.7% intending to cast empty votes. The cumulative number of these constituents is estimated at 2,167,252, dimming the prospects of unforeseen outcomes in the impending elections.
Contrastingly, public sentiment toward the current cabinet reveals 48.8% dissatisfaction and 50.6% satisfaction. The highest dissatisfaction rates emerged in Sulaymaniyah province 82.9%, Halabja 80.6%, Raperin 72.3%, and Garmian 65.6%. In contrast, 50.6% voiced satisfaction, with 24.9% being highly satisfied and 25.7% somewhat satisfied. Notably, the administration of Soran displayed the highest satisfaction levels at 65.4%, followed by Duhok 41.7% and Erbil 37.1%.
Roughly 60.3% of the surveyed population expressed their intention to participate in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, displaying similarity in turnout rates when compared to previous elections. This inclination towards participation seems to arise from a combination of new voters entering the scene and a strong aspiration among young individuals to engage in the electoral process. Moreover, the prevalent political climate and heightened polarization could also be significant factors impacting individuals’ decisions to take part in the elections. The survey indicates that three distinct groups — non-participants, undecided voters, and those opting for blank ballots — are poised to play substantial roles in the upcoming elections. Particularly noteworthy is the 39.7% of voters who intend to refrain from voting, along with 29.2% who responded positively but withheld their voting choice and 3.7%, indicated a plan to cast blank ballots. This cumulative figure amounts to 2,167,252 voters.
Presently, the combined daily production from 13 gas and oil fields, including the Khor Mor oil and gas field, which produces both condensate and gas, stands at an impressive average of 220,000 barrels. These resources are exported to domestic refineries and cater to the domestic market's demand.
The Israeli-Hamas conflict has the potential to be a transformative moment in the Kurdistan Region's global political positioning, which had experienced a period of marginalization in the aftermath of ISIS. Primarily, the unforeseen offensive by Hamas underscores the geopolitical significance of Iran's sustained pressure on the Kurdistan Region concerning the eastern opposition groups over the past year. This pressure, in the current context, acquires enhanced political relevance.
As per the central bank's data, the gap between the market and central bank exchange rates has traditionally fallen within the range of 10 to 50 dinars per dollar. However, since the start of this year, this difference has significantly widened, often exceeding 100 dinars and occasionally reaching as high as 300 dinars. These disparities starkly contrast with standard “ financial and banking regulations”, which typically consider a range of 1 to 5 thousand Iraqi dinars or 1% to 3% as normal.
This rapid acceleration in housing development is not confined to Erbil; it is a trend observed across the Kurdistan Region. In Sulaimani, for instance, the number of real estate investment projects currently underway has surged two to threefold compared to previous years, reflecting the region's robust growth and burgeoning housing market.
In this research, the author relies on various documents and sources and explains that the use of the term "Ottoman Kurdistan" refers to the historical recognition of Kurdish territory by the Ottomans.
In the Kurdistan Region, it's widely understood that elections cannot proceed without the KDP, just as they are incomplete without the PUK. Moreover, the potential absence of the KDP from the elections could trigger a chain of events impacting the security of the development road, and Iraq as a whole.
